A Theory of How the Brain Might Work

I wish to propose a quite speculative new version of the grandmother cell theory to explain how the brain, or parts of it, may work. In particular, I discuss how the visual system may learn to recognize 3D objects. The model would apply directly to the cortical cells involved in visual face recognition. I will also outline the relation of our theory to existing models of the cerebellum and of motor control. Specific biophysical mechanisms can be readily suggested as part of a basic type of neural circuitry that can learn to approximate multidimensional input-output mappings from sets of examples and that is expected to be replicated in different regions of the brain and across modalities. The main points of the theory are: -the brain uses modules for multivariate function approximation as basic components of several of its information processing subsystems. -these modules are realized as HyperBF networks (Poggio and Girosi, 1990a,b). -HyperBF networks can be implemented in terms of biologically plausible mechanisms and circuitry. The theory predicts a specific type of population coding that represents an extension of schemes such as look-up tables. I will conclude with some speculations about the trade-off between memory and computation and the evolution of intelligence.

Role of Low-level Mechanisms in Brightness Perception

Brightness judgments are a key part of the primate brain's visual analysis of the environment. There is general consensus that the perceived brightness of an image region is based not only on its actual luminance, but also on the photometric structure of its neighborhood. However, it is unclear precisely how a region's context influences its perceived brightness. Recent research has suggested that brightness estimation may be based on a sophisticated analysis of scene layout in terms of transparency, illumination and shadows. This work has called into question the role of low-level mechanisms, such as lateral inhibition, as explanations for brightness phenomena. Here we describe experiments with displays for which low-level and high-level analyses make qualitatively different predictions, and with which we can quantitatively assess the trade-offs between low-level and high-level factors. We find that brightness percepts in these displays are governed by low-level stimulus properties, even when these percepts are inconsistent with higher-level interpretations of scene layout. These results point to the important role of low-level mechanisms in determining brightness percepts.