MIT SchMUSE: Class-Based Remote Delegation in a Capricious Distributed Environment

MIT SchMUSE (pronounced "shmooz") is a concurrent, distributed, delegation-based object-oriented interactive environment with persistent storage. It is designed to run in a "capricious" network environment, where servers can migrate from site to site and can regularly become unavailable. Our design introduces a new form of unique identifiers called "globally unique tickets" that provide globally unique time/space stamps for objects and classes without being location specific. Object location is achieved by a distributed hierarchical lazy lookup mechanism that we call "realm resolution." We also introduce a novel mechanism called "message deferral" for enhanced reliability in the face of remote delegation. We conclude with a comparison to related work and a projection of future work on MIT SchMUSE.

Static Pricing for a Network Service Provider

This article studies the static pricing problem of a network service provider who has a fixed capacity and faces different types of customers (classes). Each type of customers can have its own capacity constraint but it is assumed that all classes have the same resource requirement. The provider must decide a static price for each class. The customer types are characterized by their arrival process, with a price-dependant arrival rate, and the random time they remain in the system. Many real-life situations could fit in this framework, for example an Internet provider or a call center, but originally this problem was thought for a company that sells phone-cards and needs to set the price-per-minute for each destination. Our goal is to characterize the optimal static prices in order to maximize the provider's revenue. We note that the model here presented, with some slight modifications and additional assumptions can be used in those cases when the objective is to maximize social welfare.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.