The Logical Problem of Language Change

This paper considers the problem of language change. Linguists must explain not only how languages are learned but also how and why they have evolved along certain trajectories and not others. While the language learning problem has focused on the behavior of individuals and how they acquire a particular grammar from a class of grammars ${cal G}$, here we consider a population of such learners and investigate the emergent, global population characteristics of linguistic communities over several generations. We argue that language change follows logically from specific assumptions about grammatical theories and learning paradigms. In particular, we are able to transform parameterized theories and memoryless acquisition algorithms into grammatical dynamical systems, whose evolution depicts a population's evolving linguistic composition. We investigate the linguistic and computational consequences of this model, showing that the formalization allows one to ask questions about diachronic that one otherwise could not ask, such as the effect of varying initial conditions on the resulting diachronic trajectories. From a more programmatic perspective, we give an example of how the dynamical system model for language change can serve as a way to distinguish among alternative grammatical theories, introducing a formal diachronic adequacy criterion for linguistic theories.

Computational Structure of Human Language

The central thesis of this report is that human language is NP-complete. That is, the process of comprehending and producing utterances is bounded above by the class NP, and below by NP-hardness. This constructive complexity thesis has two empirical consequences. The first is to predict that a linguistic theory outside NP is unnaturally powerful. The second is to predict that a linguistic theory easier than NP-hard is descriptively inadequate. To prove the lower bound, I show that the following three subproblems of language comprehension are all NP-hard: decide whether a given sound is possible sound of a given language; disambiguate a sequence of words; and compute the antecedents of pronouns. The proofs are based directly on the empirical facts of the language user's knowledge, under an appropriate idealization. Therefore, they are invariant across linguistic theories. (For this reason, no knowledge of linguistic theory is needed to understand the proofs, only knowledge of English.) To illustrate the usefulness of the upper bound, I show that two widely-accepted analyses of the language user's knowledge (of syntactic ellipsis and phonological dependencies) lead to complexity outside of NP (PSPACE-hard and Undecidable, respectively). Next, guided by the complexity proofs, I construct alternate linguisitic analyses that are strictly superior on descriptive grounds, as well as being less complex computationally (in NP). The report also presents a new framework for linguistic theorizing, that resolves important puzzles in generative linguistics, and guides the mathematical investigation of human language.

A Computational Model for the Acquisition and Use of Phonological Knowledge

Does knowledge of language consist of symbolic rules? How do children learn and use their linguistic knowledge? To elucidate these questions, we present a computational model that acquires phonological knowledge from a corpus of common English nouns and verbs. In our model the phonological knowledge is encapsulated as boolean constraints operating on classical linguistic representations of speech sounds in term of distinctive features. The learning algorithm compiles a corpus of words into increasingly sophisticated constraints. The algorithm is incremental, greedy, and fast. It yields one-shot learning of phonological constraints from a few examples. Our system exhibits behavior similar to that of young children learning phonological knowledge. As a bonus the constraints can be interpreted as classical linguistic rules. The computational model can be implemented by a surprisingly simple hardware mechanism. Our mechanism also sheds light on a fundamental AI question: How are signals related to symbols?