Online Learning of Non-stationary Sequences

We consider an online learning scenario in which the learner can make predictions on the basis of a fixed set of experts. The performance of each expert may change over time in a manner unknown to the learner. We formulate a class of universal learning algorithms for this problem by expressing them as simple Bayesian algorithms operating on models analogous to Hidden Markov Models (HMMs). We derive a new performance bound for such algorithms which is considerably simpler than existing bounds. The bound provides the basis for learning the rate at which the identity of the optimal expert switches over time. We find an analytic expression for the a priori resolution at which we need to learn the rate parameter. We extend our scalar switching-rate result to models of the switching-rate that are governed by a matrix of parameters, i.e. arbitrary homogeneous HMMs. We apply and examine our algorithm in the context of the problem of energy management in wireless networks. We analyze the new results in the framework of Information Theory.

Perceptual Evaluation of Video-Realistic Speech

abstract With many visual speech animation techniques now available, there is a clear need for systematic perceptual evaluation schemes. We describe here our scheme and its application to a new video-realistic (potentially indistinguishable from real recorded video) visual-speech animation system, called Mary 101. Two types of experiments were performed: a) distinguishing visually between real and synthetic image- sequences of the same utterances, ("Turing tests") and b) gauging visual speech recognition by comparing lip-reading performance of the real and synthetic image-sequences of the same utterances ("Intelligibility tests"). Subjects that were presented randomly with either real or synthetic image-sequences could not tell the synthetic from the real sequences above chance level. The same subjects when asked to lip-read the utterances from the same image-sequences recognized speech from real image-sequences significantly better than from synthetic ones. However, performance for both, real and synthetic, were at levels suggested in the literature on lip-reading. We conclude from the two experiments that the animation of Mary 101 is adequate for providing a percept of a talking head. However, additional effort is required to improve the animation for lip-reading purposes like rehabilitation and language learning. In addition, these two tasks could be considered as explicit and implicit perceptual discrimination tasks. In the explicit task (a), each stimulus is classified directly as a synthetic or real image-sequence by detecting a possible difference between the synthetic and the real image-sequences. The implicit perceptual discrimination task (b) consists of a comparison between visual recognition of speech of real and synthetic image-sequences. Our results suggest that implicit perceptual discrimination is a more sensitive method for discrimination between synthetic and real image-sequences than explicit perceptual discrimination.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.