Experimental Markets for Product Concepts

Market prices are well known to efficiently collect and aggregate diverse information regarding the value of commodities and assets. The role of markets has been particularly suitable to pricing financial securities. This article provides an alternative application of the pricing mechanism to marketing research - using pseudo-securities markets to measure preferences over new product concepts. Surveys, focus groups, concept tests and conjoint studies are methods traditionally used to measure individual and aggregate preferences. Unfortunately, these methods can be biased, costly and time-consuming to conduct. The present research is motivated by the desire to efficiently measure preferences and more accurately predict new product success, based on the efficiency and incentive-compatibility of security trading markets. The article describes a novel market research method, pro-vides insight into why the method should work, and compares the results of several trading experiments against other methodologies such as concept testing and conjoint analysis.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.