Computational Structure of Human Language

The central thesis of this report is that human language is NP-complete. That is, the process of comprehending and producing utterances is bounded above by the class NP, and below by NP-hardness. This constructive complexity thesis has two empirical consequences. The first is to predict that a linguistic theory outside NP is unnaturally powerful. The second is to predict that a linguistic theory easier than NP-hard is descriptively inadequate. To prove the lower bound, I show that the following three subproblems of language comprehension are all NP-hard: decide whether a given sound is possible sound of a given language; disambiguate a sequence of words; and compute the antecedents of pronouns. The proofs are based directly on the empirical facts of the language user's knowledge, under an appropriate idealization. Therefore, they are invariant across linguistic theories. (For this reason, no knowledge of linguistic theory is needed to understand the proofs, only knowledge of English.) To illustrate the usefulness of the upper bound, I show that two widely-accepted analyses of the language user's knowledge (of syntactic ellipsis and phonological dependencies) lead to complexity outside of NP (PSPACE-hard and Undecidable, respectively). Next, guided by the complexity proofs, I construct alternate linguisitic analyses that are strictly superior on descriptive grounds, as well as being less complex computationally (in NP). The report also presents a new framework for linguistic theorizing, that resolves important puzzles in generative linguistics, and guides the mathematical investigation of human language.

Geometric Structure of the Adaptive Controller of the Human Arm

The objects with which the hand interacts with may significantly change the dynamics of the arm. How does the brain adapt control of arm movements to this new dynamic? We show that adaptation is via composition of a model of the task's dynamics. By exploring generalization capabilities of this adaptation we infer some of the properties of the computational elements with which the brain formed this model: the elements have broad receptive fields and encode the learned dynamics as a map structured in an intrinsic coordinate system closely related to the geometry of the skeletomusculature. The low--level nature of these elements suggests that they may represent asset of primitives with which a movement is represented in the CNS.