Lean Transition of Emerging Industrial Capability

This volume of the final report documents the technical work performed from December 1998 through December 2002 under Cooperative Agreement F33615-97-2-5153 executed between the U.S. Air Force, Air Force Research Laboratory, Materials and Manufacturing Directorate, Manufacturing Technology Division (AFRL/MLM) and the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Boeing Company. The work was accomplished by The Boeing Company, Phantom Works, Huntington Beach, St. Louis, and Seattle; Ford Motor Company; Integral Inc.; Sloan School of Management in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Pratt & Whitney; and Central State University in Xenia, Ohio and in association with Raytheon Corporation. The LeanTEC program manager for AFRL is John Crabill of AFRL / MLMP and The Boeing Company program manager is Ed Shroyer of Boeing Phantom Works in Huntington Beach, CA. Financial performance under this contract is documented in the Financial Volume of the final report.

Lean Transition of Emerging Industrial Capability (LeanTEC)

Lean Transition of Emerging Industrial Capability (LeanTEC) program was a cooperative agreement between the Boeing Company and AFRL conducted from January 1998 to January 2002. The results of this program are documented in the Manual for Effective Technology Transition Processes included as an attachment to this report. This manual provides processes, procedures, and tools for greatly improving technology transition in the aerospace industry. Methodology for the implementation of these improvements is given along with methods for customizing the various processes, procedures, and tools for a given company or business unit. The indicated methodology was tested by the LeanTEC team and results are documented in the report.

Whither Japan's Economy?

The Japanese economy entered a long recession in spring 1997. Its economic growth has been much lower than in the US and the EU despite large fiscal stimulus packages, a monetary policy which has brought interest rates to zero since 1999, injections of public money to recapitalize banks, and programs of liberalization and deregulation. How could all these policies have failed to bring the Japanese economy back on a sustainable growth path? This paper argues that the failure of Japan's efforts to restore a sound economic environment is the result of having deliberately chosen inappropriate and inadequate monetary and fiscal instruments to tackle the macroeconomic and structural problems that have burdened the Japanese economy since the burst of the financial bubble at the beginning of the 90s. These choices were deliberate, since the "right" policies (in primis the resolution of the banking crisis) presented unbearable political costs, not only for the ruling parties, but also for the bureaucratic and business elites. The misfortunes of the Japanese economy during the long recession not only allow us to draw important economic policy lessons, but also stimulate reflections on the disruptive role on economic policies caused by powerful vested interests when an economy needs broad and deep structural changes. The final part of the paper focuses on ways to tackle Japan's banking crisis. In particular, it explores the Scandinavian solution, which, mutatis mutandis, might serve Japanese policy-makers well.