Motivated Action Theory: A Formal Theory of Causal Reasoning

When we reason about change over time, causation provides an implicit preference: we prefer sequences of situations in which one situation leads causally to the next, rather than sequences in which one situation follows another at random and without causal connections. In this paper, we explore the problem of temporal reasoning --- reasoning about change over time --- and the crucial role that causation plays in our intuitions. We examine previous approaches to temporal reasoning, and their shortcomings, in light of this analysis. We propose a new system for causal reasoning, motivated action theory, which builds upon causation as a crucial preference creterion. Motivated action theory solves the traditional problems of both forward and backward reasoning, and additionally provides a basis for a new theory of explanation.

Vision, Instruction, and Action

This thesis describes Sonja, a system which uses instructions in the course of visually-guided activity. The thesis explores an integration of research in vision, activity, and natural language pragmatics. Sonja's visual system demonstrates the use of several intermediate visual processes, particularly visual search and routines, previously proposed on psychophysical grounds. The computations Sonja performs are compatible with the constraints imposed by neuroscientifically plausible hardware. Although Sonja can operate autonomously, it can also make flexible use of instructions provided by a human advisor. The system grounds its understanding of these instructions in perception and action.

A Model for Deliberation, Action, and Introspection

This thesis investigates the problem of controlling or directing the reasoning and actions of a computer program. The basic approach explored is to view reasoning as a species of action, so that a program might apply its reasoning powers to the task of deciding what inferences to make as well as deciding what other actions to take. A design for the architecture of reasoning programs is proposed. This architecture involves self-consciousness, intentional actions, deliberate adaptations, and a form of decision-making based on dialectical argumentation. A program based on this architecture inspects itself, describes aspects of itself, and uses this self-reference and these self-descriptions in making decisions and taking actions. The program's mental life includes awareness of its own concepts, beliefs, desires, intentions, inferences, actions, and skills. All of these are represented by self-descriptions in a single sort of language, so that the program has access to all of these aspects of itself, and can reason about them in the same terms.