Dependency Directed Reasoning for Complex Program Understanding

Artificial Intelligence research involves the creation of extremely complex programs which must possess the capability to introspect, learn, and improve their expertise. Any truly intelligent program must be able to create procedures and to modify them as it gathers information from its experience. [Sussman, 1975] produced such a system for a 'mini-world'; but truly intelligent programs must be considerably more complex. A crucial stepping stone in AI research is the development of a system which can understand complex programs well enough to modify them. There is also a complexity barrier in the world of commercial software which is making the cost of software production and maintenance prohibitive. Here too a system which is capable of understanding complex programs is a necessary step. The Programmer's Apprentice Project [Rich and Shrobe, 76] is attempting to develop an interactive programming tool which will help expert programmers deal with the complexity involved in engineering a large software system. This report describes REASON, the deductive component of the programmer's apprentice. REASON is intended to help expert programmers in the process of evolutionary program design. REASON utilizes the engineering techniques of modelling, decomposition, and analysis by inspection to determine how modules interact to achieve the desired overall behavior of a program. REASON coordinates its various sources of knowledge by using a dependency-directed structure which records the justification for each deduction it makes. Once a program has been analyzed these justifications can be summarized into a teleological structure called a plan which helps the system understand the impact of a proposed program modification.

Preliminary Observations on Program Instability

This white paper reports emerging findings at the end of Phase I of the Lean Aircraft Initiative in the Policy focus group area. Specifically, it provides details about research on program instability. Its objective is to discuss high-level findings detailing: 1) the relative contribution of different factors to a program’s overall instability; 2) the cost impact of program instability on acquisition programs; and 3) some strategies recommended by program managers for overcoming and/or mitigating the negative effects of program instability on their programs. Because this report comes as this research is underway, this is not meant to be a definitive document on the subject. Rather, is it anticipated that this research may potentially produce a number of reports on program instability-related topics. The government managers of military acquisition programs rated annual budget or production rate changes, changes in requirements, and technical difficulties as the three top contributors, respectively, to program instability. When asked to partition actual variance in their program’s planned cost and schedule to each of these factors, it was found that the combined effects of unplanned budget and requirement changes accounted for 5.2% annual cost growth and 20% total program schedule slip. At a rate of approximately 5% annual cost growth from these factors, it is easy to see that even conservative estimates of the cost benefits to be gained from acquisition reforms and process improvements can quickly be eclipsed by the added cost associated with program instability. Program management practices involving the integration of stakeholders from throughout the value chain into the decision making process were rated the most effective at avoiding program instability. The use of advanced information technologies was rated the most effective at mitigating the negative impact of program instability.

Preliminary Observations on Program Instability

This white paper reports emerging findings at the end of Phase I of the Lean Aircraft Initiative in the Policy focus group area. Specifically, it provides details about research on program instability. Its objective is to discuss high-level findings detailing: 1) the relative contribution of different factors to a program’s overall instability; 2) the cost impact of program instability on acquisition programs; and 3) some strategies recommended by program managers for overcoming and/or mitigating the negative effects of program instability on their programs. Because this report comes as this research is underway, this is not meant to be a definitive document on the subject. Rather, is it anticipated that this research may potentially produce a number of reports on program instability-related topics. The government managers of military acquisition programs rated annual budget or production rate changes, changes in requirements, and technical difficulties as the three top contributors, respectively, to program instability. When asked to partition actual variance in their program’s planned cost and schedule to each of these factors, it was found that the combined effects of unplanned budget and requirement changes accounted for 5.2% annual cost growth and 20% total program schedule slip. At a rate of approximately 5% annual cost growth from these factors, it is easy to see that even conservative estimates of the cost benefits to be gained from acquisition reforms and process improvements can quickly be eclipsed by the added cost associated with program instability. Program management practices involving the integration of stakeholders from throughout the value chain into the decision making process were rated the most effective at avoiding program instability. The use of advanced information technologies was rated the most effective at mitigating the negative impact of program instability.

Technology Supply Chains: An Introductory Essay

This working paper was originally printed in the Working Paper Series of the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program