An Electronic Market-Maker

This paper presents an adaptive learning model for market-making under the reinforcement learning framework. Reinforcement learning is a learning technique in which agents aim to maximize the long-term accumulated rewards. No knowledge of the market environment, such as the order arrival or price process, is assumed. Instead, the agent learns from real-time market experience and develops explicit market-making strategies, achieving multiple objectives including the maximizing of profits and minimization of the bid-ask spread. The simulation results show initial success in bringing learning techniques to building market-making algorithms.

Exploring Bit-Difference for Approximate KNN Search in High-dimensional Databases

In this paper, we develop a novel index structure to support efficient approximate k-nearest neighbor (KNN) query in high-dimensional databases. In high-dimensional spaces, the computational cost of the distance (e.g., Euclidean distance) between two points contributes a dominant portion of the overall query response time for memory processing. To reduce the distance computation, we first propose a structure (BID) using BIt-Difference to answer approximate KNN query. The BID employs one bit to represent each feature vector of point and the number of bit-difference is used to prune the further points. To facilitate real dataset which is typically skewed, we enhance the BID mechanism with clustering, cluster adapted bitcoder and dimensional weight, named the BID⁺. Extensive experiments are conducted to show that our proposed method yields significant performance advantages over the existing index structures on both real life and synthetic high-dimensional datasets.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.