Quantitative Inference in a Mechanical Design Compiler

This paper presents the ideas underlying a program that takes as input a schematic of a mechanical or hydraulic power transmission system, plus specifications and a utility function, and returns catalog numbers from predefined catalogs for the optimal selection of components implementing the design. It thus provides the designer with a high level "language" in which to compose new designs, then performs some of the detailed design process for him. The program is based on a formalization of quantitative inferences about hierarchically organized sets of artifacts and operating conditions, which allows design compilation without the exhaustive enumeration of alternatives.

A Theory of Quantitative Inference Applied to a Mechanical Design Compiler

This thesis presents the ideas underlying a computer program that takes as input a schematic of a mechanical or hydraulic power transmission system, plus specifications and a utility function, and returns catalog numbers from predefined catalogs for the optimal selection of components implementing the design. Unlike programs for designing single components or systems, the program provides the designer with a high level "language" in which to compose new designs. It then performs some of the detailed design process. The process of "compilation" is based on a formalization of quantitative inferences about hierarchically organized sets of artifacts and operating conditions. This allows the design compilation without the exhaustive enumeration of alternatives.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.