Procedures as a Representation for Data in a Computer Program for Understanding Natural Language

This paper describes a system for the computer understanding of English. The system answers questions, executes commands, and accepts information in normal English dialog. It uses semantic information and context to understand discourse and to disambiguate sentences. It combines a complete syntactic analysis of each sentence with a "heuristic understander" which uses different kinds of information about a sentence, other parts of the discourse, and general information about the world in deciding what the sentence means. It is based on the belief that a computer cannot deal reasonably with language unless it can "understand" the subject it is discussing. The program is given a detailed model of the knowledge needed by a simple robot having only a hand and an eye. We can give it instructions to manipulate toy objects, interrogate it about the scene, and give it information it will use in deduction. In addition to knowing the properties of toy objects, the program has a simple model of its own mentality. It can remember and discuss its plans and actions as well as carry them out. It enters into a dialog with a person, responding to English sentences with actions and English replies, and asking for clarification when its heuristic programs cannot understand a sentence through use of context and physical knowledge.

Face processing in humans is compatible with a simple shape-based model of vision

Understanding how the human visual system recognizes objects is one of the key challenges in neuroscience. Inspired by a large body of physiological evidence (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Hubel and Wiesel, 1962; Livingstone and Hubel, 1988; Tso et al., 2001; Zeki, 1993), a general class of recognition models has emerged which is based on a hierarchical organization of visual processing, with succeeding stages being sensitive to image features of increasing complexity (Hummel and Biederman, 1992; Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999; Selfridge, 1959). However, these models appear to be incompatible with some well-known psychophysical results. Prominent among these are experiments investigating recognition impairments caused by vertical inversion of images, especially those of faces. It has been reported that faces that differ "featurally" are much easier to distinguish when inverted than those that differ "configurally" (Freire et al., 2000; Le Grand et al., 2001; Mondloch et al., 2002) ??finding that is difficult to reconcile with the aforementioned models. Here we show that after controlling for subjects' expectations, there is no difference between "featurally" and "configurally" transformed faces in terms of inversion effect. This result reinforces the plausibility of simple hierarchical models of object representation and recognition in cortex.