58 resultados para Probabilities

em University of Michigan


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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

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"Supersedes NBS Special Publications 320, 320 Supplement 1 and 320 Supplement 2" -t.p.

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"Completed as a cooperative effort between the U.S. Department of Commerce, Environmental Science Services Administration, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service."

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Translation of Lettres à S.A.R. le duc régnant de Saxe-Coburg et Gotha, sur la théorie des probabilités, appliquée aux sciences morales et politiques.

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"A paper presented at the joint meeting of the Bometric Society and the institute of Mathematical Statistics, November 27, 1948, at Seattle, Washington."

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Frequentist statistical methods continue to predominate in many areas of science despite prominent calls for "statistical reform." They do so in part because their main rivals, Bayesian methods, appeal to prior probability distributions that arguably lack an objective justification in typical cases. Some methodologists find a third approach called likelihoodism attractive because it avoids important objections to frequentism without appealing to prior probabilities. However, likelihoodist methods do not provide guidance for belief or action, but only assessments of data as evidence. I argue that there is no good way to use those assessments to guide beliefs or actions without appealing to prior probabilities, and that as a result likelihoodism is not a viable alternative to frequentism and Bayesianism for statistical reform efforts in science.