Fixed wing flight.

April 18, 1980.

Organizing for flight operations.

Mode of access: Internet.

A study of engine simulation methods for operational flight trainers

Cover title.

General aviation pilot stall awareness training study /

Mode of access: Internet.

Criteria for acceptable representation of airplane dynamic responses in simulators used for pilot training.

"Contract no. N61339-1146."

The role of prediction in training with a simulated orbital docking task

Cover title.

Airplane flying handbook.

"FAA-H-8083-3"--Cover.

180-degree turn experiment,

Bibliography: p. [60]

Dynamic test program for weapons system trainers. Project 413(2) Final report.

"Contract N61339-318."

75th year of naval aviation ; diamond anniversary /

"A commemorative collection."

Commercial pilot question book.

"AVN-130 09/86"--Cover.

B-29 : pilots' and flight engineers' training manual for the Superfortress /

Includes index.

In-flight simulation, theory and application,

"To be presented to the Fluid Dynamics Panel of the Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 April through 17 April 1961."

Aircraft accident report : crash of Pinnacle Airlines flight 3701, Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N8396A, Jefferson City, Missouri, October 14, 2004 /

On October 14, 2004, about 2215:06 central daylight time, Pinnacle Airlines flight 3701 (doing business as Northwest Airlink), a Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N8396A, crashed into a residential area about 2.5 miles south of Jefferson City Memorial Airport, Jefferson City, Missouri. The airplane was on a repositioning flight from Little Rock National Airport, Little Rock, Arkansas, to Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, Minneapolis, Minnesota. During the flight, both engines flamed out after a pilot-induced aerodynamic stall and were unable to be restarted. The captain and the first officer were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. No one on the ground was injured. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were (1) the pilots' unprofessional behavior, deviation from standard operating procedures, and poor airmanship, which resulted in an in-flight emergency from which they were unable to recover, in part because of the pilots' inadequate training; (2) the pilots' failure to prepare for an emergency landing in a timely manner, including communicating with air traffic controllers immediately after the emergency about the loss of both engines and the availability of landing sites; and (3) the pilots' improper management of the double engine failure checklist, which allowed the engine cores to stop rotating and resulted in the core lock engine condition. Contributing to this accident were (1) the core lock engine condition, which prevented at least one engine from being restarted, and (2) the airplane flight manuals that did not communicate to pilots the importance of maintaining a minimum airspeed to keep the engine cores rotating.

Cliff Keen, UM Wrestilng coach, with Navy training officers, 1943

[possibly at Navy Pre-Flight School in Georgia]