254 resultados para Soldiers of fortune.


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no. 1. The call to battle -- no. 2. Leaving the old home -- no. 3. Off to the war -- no. 4. Over field and meadow -- no. 5. When war is over.

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First published in 1891 under title: Tales of soldiers and civilians.

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Includes English and Italian recipes; some recipes include wine or liquor as an ingredient. Sample recipes: Stuffed oysters, Almond drop cakes, Ravioli.

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Georges de La Tour; 3 ft. 4 1/8 in.x 4 ft. 5/8 in.; oil on canvas

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Caption title.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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Prepared and published under the direction of Brigadier General C. Angus Fraser, the adjutant general of North Dakota. By authority of Legislative Assembly of North Dakota.

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[Vol. I] includes a preface by J. van den Heuvel, minister of state, reports 1-12, and extracts from the pastoral letter of Cardinal Mercier, archbishop of Malines; vol. II includes reports 13-22, with facsimiles of German soldiers' diaries, correspondence between Cardinal Mercier and the German authorities, the protest of Mgr. Heylen, bishop of Namur, etc., etc., appended.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii.