Organizational, direct, and general support maintenance manual for cleaning procedures for Army aircraft.

Includes index.

Operator's and crewmember's checklist : Army model OV-1B airplane, observation stol.

"22 February 1979."

Avionic cleaning and corrosion prevention/control : organizational and intermediate.

"NAVAIR 16-1-540."

Aviation unit and intermediate maintenance repair parts and special tools list (including depot maintenance repair parts and special tools) for aircraft, observation OV-1B, OV-1C, OV-1D, and RV-1D aircraft, reconnaissance, NSN 1510-00-715-9379 (OV-1B) ...

"15 March 1990."

Inspection and maintenance of U.S. Army-owned foreign rail equipment.

"March 1970."

Aviation unit and aviation intermediate maintenance manual : Army models U-21A, RU-21A, and RU-21D.

"31 December 1976"--Vol. 1.

Operator's and crewmember's checklist : Army model RU-21H aircraft : pilot's checklist.

"1 November 1982."

Operator's and crewmember's checklist : Army models RU-21A and RU-21D aircraft : pilot's checklist.

"3 September 1982."

Operator's and crewmember's checklist : Army model OV-1D/RV-1D.

"November 1978."

Operator's and crewmember's checklist : Army model U-21A aircraft : pilot's checklist.

"26 September 1988."

Operator and organizational maintenance manual : radio sets AN/ARC-73 and AN/ARC-73A.

"November 1962."

Warriors and statesmen, from the "gleanings" of the late Earl Brassey. Selected and arranged by Horace G. Hutchinson.

Mode of access: Internet.

Empowering the president to regulate ocean freight rates and to requistion vessels and increasing the powers of the United States Shipping board. Hearings before the Committee on the merchant marine and fisheries ... sixty-fifth Congress, second session, on H.R. 11361 and H. R. 11362 ...

Mode of access: Internet.

Army baker.

"This pamphlet supersedes Training manual--The army baker, September 1, 1926 (including C1, TM 2100-151, January 2, 1934, and C2, January 3, 1939)"--Foot-note, p. [1].

Shades of CORDS in the Kush : the false hope of "unity of effort" in American counterinsurgency /

"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii.