TECOM, international testing.

Mode of access: Internet.

TECOM, live fire testing.

Mode of access: Internet.

Control signaling in a military switching environment /

Jan. 1979.

Fort Bliss Field Unit, Fort Bliss, Texas, 1974-1994.

"November 1995."

USAEC, Environmental Technology Division.

Mode of access: Internet.

Russian map symbols.

Mode of access: Internet.

Technical report /

Mode of access: Internet.

Democratic governance and the rule of law : lessons from Colombia /

"Colombia has experienced conflict for decades. In the 1990s it was a paradigm of the failing state, beset with all manner of troubles: terrorism, kidnapping, murder, drug trafficking, corruption, an economic downturn of major scope, general lawlessness, and brain drain. Today the country is much safer, and the agents of violence are clearly on the defensive. Nonetheless, much work lies ahead to secure the democratic system. Security and the rule of law are fundamental to the task. As the monopoly over the legitimate use of force is established, democratic governance also needs the architecture of law: ministry of justice, courts, legislative scrutiny, law enforcement agencies, regulatory bodies, public defenders, police, correctional system, legal statutes, contracts, university level academic education to train lawyers, judges, and investigators, along with engagement with civil society to promote a culture of lawfulness. Security without the rule of law puts a society at risk of falling into a Hobbesian hell."--P. v.

Shades of CORDS in the Kush : the false hope of "unity of effort" in American counterinsurgency /

"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii.

Silicon carbide for semiconductors /

"February 1965."

Machining and grinding of titanium and its alloys /

"August 1965."

The effects of gas occlusions and strains on the magnetic properties of thin permalloy films /

"May 1965."

Survey of available high pressure pneumatic components : (5,000 PSI and UP) /

"July 1954."

Preindications of failure in electronic components /

"July 1965."

National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program : carpet and carpet cushion /

"October 1994."