26 resultados para Mixed-mode end load split


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Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C.

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Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C.

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Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C.

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Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C.

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Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics Division, Washington, D.C.

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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

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Transportation Department, Washington, D.C.

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Transportation Department, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, Washington, D.C.

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Twelfth ed. consists of index only.

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After the electoral reform in 1994, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a multi-party system toward a two-party system over the course of five House of Representatives election cycles. In contrast, after Taiwan’s constitutional amendment in 2005, a two-party system emerged in the first post-reform legislative election in 2008. Critically, however, Taiwan’s president is directly elected while Japan’s prime minister is indirectly elected. The contributors conclude that the higher the payoffs of holding the executive office and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems to demonstrate its generality. They find the effect of executive competition on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The findings presented in this book have important implications for political reform. Often, reformers are motivated by high hopes of solving some political problems and enhancing the quality of democracy. But, as this group of scholars demonstrates, electoral reform alone is not a panacea. Whether and to what extent it achieves the advocated goals depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.