58 resultados para Legislators


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Employment demands protection.--Why any exclusive policy?--The free trade trap.--Protection enriched us, not free trade.--Free trade poisons patriotism.--Kill industries and commerce dies.--Theories are dangerous guides.--Industrial displacements spell ruin.--Independence the only policy.--The fatal policy of laissez faire.--"Cheap and nasty."--Our unearned increment.--Free trade a spiteful mistress.--The fertility of character.--We cultivate weakness, not strength.--Britons can manage British business.--Second markets.--The country's average wage.--If trusts, then British trusts.--Labour's true interests.--Germany and her navy.--Class-hatred is suicide.--The tax on wheat.--The little-Englander rat.--The seeds of decay.--Education and patriotism.--Intemperate legislators.--National strongholds.--Futile scheming.--The balance of power.--The suffragette among nations.--Naval warfare in the future.--Universal service.--Broken reeds.

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Includes index.

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Description based on: 1993-94.

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After the electoral reform in 1994, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a multi-party system toward a two-party system over the course of five House of Representatives election cycles. In contrast, after Taiwan’s constitutional amendment in 2005, a two-party system emerged in the first post-reform legislative election in 2008. Critically, however, Taiwan’s president is directly elected while Japan’s prime minister is indirectly elected. The contributors conclude that the higher the payoffs of holding the executive office and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems to demonstrate its generality. They find the effect of executive competition on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The findings presented in this book have important implications for political reform. Often, reformers are motivated by high hopes of solving some political problems and enhancing the quality of democracy. But, as this group of scholars demonstrates, electoral reform alone is not a panacea. Whether and to what extent it achieves the advocated goals depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.

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Includes index.

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Kept current with cumulative addenda.

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Has occasional updates issued between legislative sessions that include phone numbers.

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Description based on: Jan. 1947; title from cover.

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Includes index.

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Description based on: 1989; title from cover.

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Mode of access: Internet.