Regionalism as trading blocks, a comparative analysis of the legal structure of the EC and NAFTA within the context of the WTO


Autoria(s): O'Neill, Maria
Contribuinte(s)

Abertay University. Dundee Business School

Data(s)

11/11/2016

11/11/2016

18/09/1999

Resumo

Geography has almost become obsolete. The world’s goods and services can now be accessed instantaneously by electronic commerce. Small and medium sized countries have felt the cold winds of change blowing, and have adopted the “safety in numbers” philosophy. Regional organisations throughout the world have sprung up, with their original raison d'être the encouragement and development of regional trading blocks. Two of the most developed regional groupings are the EU/EC and NAFTA. These two organisations represent two quite different philosophies of regional trade groupings, with contrasting legal structures. The advent of Trade Globalisation, with the founding of the WTO has brought these two approaches into confrontation, as each side of the Atlantic Ocean tries to influence the development on the naissant WTO. This paper examines the two contrasting legal structures, and the conflict on an inter regional level that they are engendering.

Identificador

O'Neill, M. 1999. Regionalism as trading blocks, a comparative analysis of the legal structure of the EC and NAFTA within the context of the WTO. Paper presented at: 3rd Annual Conference of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, “After the Global Crises: What next for Regionalism?, 16th – 18th September 1999, Scarman House, University of Warwick.

http://hdl.handle.net/10373/2529

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/csgr-events/conferences/1999_conferences/3rdannualconference/papers/oneill.pdf

Idioma(s)

en

Direitos

The full text of this conference paper is available from: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/csgr-events/conferences/1999_conferences/3rdannualconference/papers/oneill.pdf

Tipo

Conference Paper

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