W stronę radykalnego pluralizmu religijnego

Książka stanowi poszerzoną i uzupełnioną wersję pracy magisterskiej, napisanej pod kierunkiem prof. Tadeusza Buksińskiego w Instytucie Filozofii im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu.

The main theme of my work is an encounter of religions. Its multidimensionality: confrontation of different views on Absolute, views on salvation, different religious ethics, patterns of sainthood and mystical experience – all of these points form the subject of philosophical reflection. The aim of this paper is an attempt to create some adequate philosophical model of such an encounter. My primary, and at the same time critical, point of reference is the conception of religious pluralism created by John Hick. By criticizing his approach I would like to refer to the thought of both his contemporary adversaries and religious thinkers, especially to Eastern philosophers: Arabian, Hindu and Chinese. The model coming out from this analysis, named radical religious pluralism, lets us judge the chances of effective interreligious dialogue nowadays. In the first part of my work I present some possible ways in which different religions relate to others. Schematically I reduce these relations to three basic types: negative – war, 180 Summary positive – dialogues and neutral – tolerance. The idea of inevitable religious war is considered with reference to conceptions of Samuel Huntington and Peter Sloterdijk. Analysis of the hermeneutical vision of dialogue is based on the conception of Raimund Panikkar. Finally, describing notions of religious tolerance I refer to the foundational concepts of John Locke, Baruch Spinoza and Voltaire. In the second part I reconstruct religious pluralism of Hick, one of the most important representatives of analytical philosophy of religion. Firstly, I try to explicate the meaning of notions of religious exclusivism and inclusivism, between which Hick’s pluralism is situated. I refer also to the documents of particular religions, which determine the relation of some religion to other confessions. Further I describe in details main idea of Hick’s pluralism: connection between so-called Real an sich and Real pro nobis. I retrace ontological characteristics of Absolute and epistemological presumptions of Hick, lying under his model. Then I try to see how that what Hick calls critical realism has had an influence on his view on soteriological end, mystical experience, pattern of sainthood and ethical code. I carefully analyse some examples illustrating his thesis, especially those from Eastern religions. In the last paragraph I try to found some anticipations of Hick’s model. I put stress on philosophies of al ‘Arabī and Ramakrishna. Nevertheless, I strongly refute Kantian extraction of religious pluralism. In the third part of my work I go on to critique of Hick’s pluralism. I agree with Muhammad Legenhausen and accept the variety of forms of religious pluralism. I show examples of alternative religious pluralisms: theological, sociological and philosophical, especially from analytical philosophy. In the first paragraph I present the idea of variety of religious ends according to Mark Heim. Then I criticize some essentialist Summary theories of mystique, referring mainly to Rudolf Otto. Finally, on the basis of the source material and accepted strategies of interpretation I construct pluralism of religious ethics and patterns of sainthood. The fourth and the last part of my work summarizes and surmounts results of previous parts. Firstly, I put forward main epistemological objections concerning critical realism. Then I try to construct my own conception of radical religious pluralism, escaping from these charges. The main assumption of this model assumes the plurality of: (1) the forms of salvation and (2) the forms of mystical experience and (3) moral principles and finally, what is the most outstanding issue, (5) plurality of Realities. Apart from Perfect Being, there are many other Realities: Emptiness, Nature of Buddha, Dao and so on. I explain this view in details and defend this view because of many counterarguments, especially trying to prove that only one Absolute is possible. Further, I show some inspirations of such an approach coming from religious studies and philosophy. Finally, I make an attempt to answer the question of practical implications of radical religious pluralism for interreligious communication. Exploiting Habermas’ theory of communication I distinguish basic levels of this communication and try to persuade that previous assumptions were necessary for the dialogue conceived in such a way.

Dofinansowano z Funduszu dla Młodych Naukowców Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu.