Testimonial Injustice without Credibility Deficit (or Excess)


Autoria(s): Luzzi, Federico
Contribuinte(s)

University of Aberdeen, Divinity, History & Philosophy, Philosophy

Data(s)

05/08/2016

05/08/2016

25/07/2016

Resumo

Peer reviewed

Postprint

Identificador

Luzzi , F 2016 , ' Testimonial Injustice without Credibility Deficit (or Excess) ' Thought: A Journal of Philosophy .

2161-2234

PURE: 68111383

PURE UUID: cc2b6e85-d264-4631-a2c8-9376d476e454

http://hdl.handle.net/2164/7115

Idioma(s)

eng

Relação

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

Direitos

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [FULL CITE], which has been published in final form at doi: 10.1002/tht3.212. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

Palavras-Chave #testimonial injustice #epistemic injustice #Miranda Fricker #mansplaining #credibility deficit #due credibility #B Philosophy (General) #B1
Tipo

Journal article