Strategic segmentation: when two monopolies are better than one


Autoria(s): Bakó, Barna; Kálecz-Simon, András
Data(s)

28/07/2014

Resumo

In this article we show that the price and the profit of an incumbent firm may increase after a new firm enters its market. Our analysis suggests that a well-established firm after competition emerges on its market might benefit from excluding some consumers from the low- end segment and concentrate only on its loyal consumers. We also find that strategic de-marketing can increase social welfare.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1729/7/strategic_seg_loc_2-3.pdf

Bakó, Barna and Kálecz-Simon, András (2014) Strategic segmentation: when two monopolies are better than one. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Department of Microeconomics. (Unpublished)

Publicador

Corvinus University of Budapest Department of Microeconomics

Relação

http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1729/

Palavras-Chave #Economics
Tipo

Monograph

NonPeerReviewed