A Price-setting Game with a Nonatomic Fringe


Autoria(s): Tasnádi, Attila
Data(s)

2000

Resumo

This paper extends the Bertrand-Edgeworth price-setting game with finitely many firms to a game with infinitely many firms. Taking a market with one significant firm and a nonatomic fringe, we present a microfoundation of dominant-firm price leadership.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/298/1/Tasnadi_EL_2000_v69_p63.pdf

Tasnádi, Attila (2000) A Price-setting Game with a Nonatomic Fringe. Economics Letters, 69 (1). pp. 63-69. DOI 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0>

Publicador

Elsevier

Relação

http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/298/

http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176500002640

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00264-0

Palavras-Chave #Mathematics, Econometrics
Tipo

Article

PeerReviewed

Idioma(s)

en

en