Two conceptions of reason


Autoria(s): D'Agostino, Fred
Contribuinte(s)

Graeme Thompson

Data(s)

01/02/2006

Resumo

Two conceptions of reason are considered - the planning conception, embodied, for example, in rational choice theory and other familiar paradigms, and the improvisational conception, emerging from work on artificial intelligence and organization theory. Two illustrations are given of the problematic nature of the planning conception: ( 1) the inevitability of incompleteness in contracting and ( 2) the burdens of reason identified by John Rawls. Two diagnoses are provided for these infirmities: ( 1) the inexhaustibility of description and ( 2) the constructed nature of preferences and values. An alternative improvisational model is sketched and risk-spreading and bet-hedging are identified as two of its key technologies.

Identificador

http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:81205

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Routledge

Palavras-Chave #Reason #Improvisation #Planning #Constructed Preferences #Inexhaustibility #Incompleteness #Economics #Sociology #C1 #220000 Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts - General
Tipo

Journal Article