Who Eats the Most? :Quantitative Analysis of Pork Barrel Distributions in the Philippines


Autoria(s): Kawanaka, Takeshi
Data(s)

31/10/2007

31/10/2007

01/10/2007

Resumo

Since a pork barrel is crucial in buying off voters, competition over the distributions among legislators has been considered as one of the main factors in producing congressional political dynamism and congressional institutions. This paper aims to test the theory of pork barrel distributions in the Philippines through OLS regression on the quantitative data of the 12th congress. The results show that some attributes of legislators are statistically significant in estimating pork barrel allocations, but, do not support the hypothesis that the legislators’ proximity to leaders is a determining factor in the distributions.

Identificador

IDE Discussion Paper. No. 126. 2007.10

http://hdl.handle.net/2344/633

IDE Discussion Paper

126

Idioma(s)

en

eng

Publicador

Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO

日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所

Palavras-Chave #Pork barrel #Legislative politics #Budget #Philippines #Politics #Subsidies #Political corruption #Legislation #ポークバレル #議会政治 #予算 #フィリピン #政治 #補助金 #腐敗 #汚職 #立法 #315 #AHPH Philippines フィリピン #32
Tipo

Working Paper

Technical Report