How Preliminary Are Preliminary Decisions?


Autoria(s): Schrackmann, Michael; Oswald, Margit
Data(s)

2014

Resumo

The present research focuses on the question of whether even a preliminary decision causes a confirmation bias in order to maintain the status quo and examines individual differences in consistency between the preliminary and final decision and biased information processing. Dispositional Need for Closure (NFC, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) was expected to predict revision or maintenance of the preliminary decision (decision consistency) after additional information on the issue was searched for and evaluated. Participants higher on dispositional NFC were less likely to change their preliminary decision than participants lower on dispositional NFC. Furthermore, the effect of NFC on decision consistency was fully mediated by biased information evaluation following the preliminary decision.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://boris.unibe.ch/43914/1/Schrackmann%2C%20M.%20%26%20Oswald%20M.%20E.%20%282014%29.pdf

Schrackmann, Michael; Oswald, Margit (2014). How Preliminary Are Preliminary Decisions? Swiss journal of psychology, 73(1), pp. 5-11. Huber 10.1024/1421-0185/a000122 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1024/1421-0185/a000122>

doi:10.7892/boris.43914

info:doi:10.1024/1421-0185/a000122

urn:issn:1421-0185

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Huber

Relação

http://boris.unibe.ch/43914/

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess

Fonte

Schrackmann, Michael; Oswald, Margit (2014). How Preliminary Are Preliminary Decisions? Swiss journal of psychology, 73(1), pp. 5-11. Huber 10.1024/1421-0185/a000122 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1024/1421-0185/a000122>

Palavras-Chave #300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/article

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

PeerReviewed