When social accounts work: evidence from ultimatum games


Autoria(s): von Bieberstein, Frauke; Hack, Andreas
Data(s)

06/03/2008

Resumo

This paper examines the mitigating effect of social accounts on retaliatory behavior in a miniultimatum game setting. Results from games with 108 German high school students support the hypothesis that an ex ante informational and sensitive message can decrease an individuals’ negative perception of an unfair offer and increase the acceptance of the outcome. Furthermore, the moderating effect of gender on retaliatory behavior is investigated. We show that an informational and sensitive message makes more of a difference for women in accepting unfair distributions than it does for men.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://boris.unibe.ch/42417/7/crisp13_14.pdf

von Bieberstein, Frauke; Hack, Andreas (2008). When social accounts work: evidence from ultimatum games. Current Research in Social Psychology, 13(14), pp. 161-174. University of Iowa

doi:10.7892/boris.42417

urn:issn:1088-7423

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

University of Iowa

Relação

http://boris.unibe.ch/42417/

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Fonte

von Bieberstein, Frauke; Hack, Andreas (2008). When social accounts work: evidence from ultimatum games. Current Research in Social Psychology, 13(14), pp. 161-174. University of Iowa

Palavras-Chave #650 Management & public relations
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/article

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

PeerReviewed