Singh v The Queen: A Path Toward Confusion, Redundancy and Doctrinal Inconsistency

In Walkington v The Queen, the English Court of Criminal Appeal enunciated criteria fordetermining whether a building contains parts thereof for purposes of ss 76 and 77 of the CrimesAct 1958 (Vic): burglary and aggravated burglary respectively. In Singh v The Queen, the VictorianCourt of Appeal was confronted with a situation in which a trespassory entry had been made into abuilding that, according to the principles enunciated in Walkington, did not consist of any part orparts. Recognizing that there was scant evidence with which to prove that the accused’s entry hadbeen accompanied by an intention to commit one of the crimes specified in ss 76 and 77, the courtnonetheless affirmed the applicant’s conviction for aggravated burglary under s 77. In so doing,the court reaffirmed its earlier decision in The Queen v Chimirri which held that a trespassoryentry into a building results in continuing trespass for as long as the accused remains in thebuilding. In Chimirri, it was further held that if an accused forms an intention to commit one ofthe specified crimes subsequent to the initial trespassory entry and enters a part of the buildingwith that intention, he or she has committed burglary, aggravated burglary, or both by virtueof the continuing trespass doctrine. The discussion to follow will demonstrate that the court’sreasoning in both Chimirri and Singh is not only flawed, but flies in the face of the very passagesfrom the judgment of Lane LJ in Walkington that were quoted with apparent approval in Singh.The discussion will further demonstrate that the continuing trespass doctrine adds nothing of valueto the law of burglary as it existed prior to Chimirri and Singh; rather, its only effect is to addconfusion and uncertainty to what had been a settled area of the law.