The ‘great unwatched’ and the ‘lightly touched’: surveillance and stock market fraud

This chapter examines financial corporate crime, specifically the discontinuitiesand asymmetries in power that condition the differential uses of surveillance andsurveillance technologies in the governance of stock market fraud. It studiesstate and non-state control ('rule at a distance') (Rose and Miller 1992), theresistance practiced by the powerful economic actors who make up national andinternational equity trading markets, and the control efforts of regulatory agenciescharged with preventing, regulating and enforcing laws to counter stockmarket crime. At a theoretical level the study critiques the claims of surveillanceliteratures that technologically mediated surveillance, 'the new transparency',renders all social fields visible, and therefore knowable, manageable and governable(Haggerty and Ericson 2000), by documenting and interrogating how codeis used by powerful bankers, lawyers, accountants and stock brokers to construct'visibility covers' (Williams 2008: 1; Snider 2009; Braithwaite 2005).