An efficient privatization mechanism


Autoria(s): Anbarci, Nejat; Karaaslan, Mehmet E.
Data(s)

01/02/1998

Resumo

We consider the privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of which markets can be opened to competition once privatization takes place and competitors can compete successfully against them in a few years. The currently used "Revenue Maximization (RM)" scheme maximizes the government revenue from privatization but does not provide incentives for the privatized SOE to charge a price lower than the monopoly price until competition arises. We propose the "Welfare Maximization (WMY scheme, which induces the privatized SOE to charge a competitive price without resorting to regulation. Also, WM provides greater incentives for post-privatization cost reduction.<br />

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30024640

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Routledge

Relação

http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30024640/anbarci-anefficient-1998.pdf

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13841289808523374

Direitos

1998,Taylor & Francis

Tipo

Journal Article