An efficient privatization mechanism
Data(s) |
01/02/1998
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Resumo |
We consider the privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of which markets can be opened to competition once privatization takes place and competitors can compete successfully against them in a few years. The currently used "Revenue Maximization (RM)" scheme maximizes the government revenue from privatization but does not provide incentives for the privatized SOE to charge a price lower than the monopoly price until competition arises. We propose the "Welfare Maximization (WMY scheme, which induces the privatized SOE to charge a competitive price without resorting to regulation. Also, WM provides greater incentives for post-privatization cost reduction.<br /> |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Routledge |
Relação |
http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30024640/anbarci-anefficient-1998.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13841289808523374 |
Direitos |
1998,Taylor & Francis |
Tipo |
Journal Article |