Providence and method : Herbert Butterfield and the interpretation of history

This thesis presents an extended critical analysis of the methodological thought of the Cambridge historian Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979). It is based on the full range of his published works, as well as unpublished material. It is a contribution to the history of historiography, and to the theory of history. The thesis concentrates on the relationship between Butterfield’s views on historical research and historiographical narration, and his concept of a ‘historical process’ which was the expression of a ‘providential order’. The principal problem in Butterfield’s writings is the contradiction between his advocacy of a ‘technical history’ seen as free and independent of any interpretative presupposition, and his belief in Providence and its utilisation in the course of his historiography. Firstly, the thesis argues that Butterfield employs his own presuppositions even without making explicit references to his belief in Providence. Secondly, it explains why he embraced and advocated two contradictory standpoints. Butterfield’s position is best clarified with reference to the content of his Christian beliefs. It is argued that Butterfield regarded all non-Christian interpretations of history as distorting oversimplifications. They were for him not fully scientific and rigorous, because they selected some phenomenon, or principle, or institution arising within human history and made it the central interpretative principle. He saw his own practice as exempt from this criticism. This thesis argues that Butterfield’s position is nevertheless interpretative. However, it is argued that Butterfield’s critique of ideologically based historiographic distortions and oversimplifications is important in the assessment of rival interpretations of history.