Endogenous transportation technology in a cournot differential game with intraindustry trade
Data(s) |
01/03/2009
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Resumo |
We investigate a dynamic Cournot duopoly with intraindustry trade, where firms invest in R&D to reduce the level of iceberg transportation costs. We adopt both open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium concepts, showing that a unique (saddle point) steady state exists in both cases. In the open-loop model, optimal investments and the resulting efficiency of transportation technology are independent of the relative size of the two countries. On the contrary, in the closed-loop case firms’ R&D incentives are driven by the relative size of the two countries. Policy implications are also evaluated.<br /> |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Elsevier B. V. |
Relação |
http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30022986/colombo-endogenous-2009.pdf http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30022986/colombo-endogenous-evidence-2009.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.japwor.2008.04.001 |
Direitos |
2008, Elsevier B.V. |
Palavras-Chave | #R&D #differential games #transport and communication costs #intraindustry trade |
Tipo |
Journal Article |