Rigorous development of safety-critical systems

Nowadays, computer-based systems tend to become more complex and control increasingly critical functions affecting different areas of human activities. Failures of such systems might result in loss of human lives as well as significant damage to the environment. Therefore, their safety needs to be ensured. However, the development of safety-critical systems is not a trivial exercise. Hence, to preclude design faults and guarantee the desired behaviour, different industrial standards prescribe the use of rigorous techniques for development and verification of such systems. The more critical the system is, the more rigorous approach should be undertaken. To ensure safety of a critical computer-based system, satisfaction of the safety requirements imposed on this system should be demonstrated. This task involves a number of activities. In particular, a set of the safety requirements is usually derived by conducting various safety analysis techniques. Strong assurance that the system satisfies the safety requirements can be provided by formal methods, i.e., mathematically-based techniques. At the same time, the evidence that the system under consideration meets the imposed safety requirements might be demonstrated by constructing safety cases. However, the overall safety assurance process of critical computerbased systems remains insufficiently defined due to the following reasons. Firstly, there are semantic differences between safety requirements and formal models. Informally represented safety requirements should be translated into the underlying formal language to enable further veri cation. Secondly, the development of formal models of complex systems can be labour-intensive and time consuming. Thirdly, there are only a few well-defined methods for integration of formal verification results into safety cases. This thesis proposes an integrated approach to the rigorous development and verification of safety-critical systems that (1) facilitates elicitation of safety requirements and their incorporation into formal models, (2) simplifies formal modelling and verification by proposing specification and refinement patterns, and (3) assists in the construction of safety cases from the artefacts generated by formal reasoning. Our chosen formal framework is Event-B. It allows us to tackle the complexity of safety-critical systems as well as to structure safety requirements by applying abstraction and stepwise refinement. The Rodin platform, a tool supporting Event-B, assists in automatic model transformations and proof-based verification of the desired system properties. The proposed approach has been validated by several case studies from different application domains.