Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
| Data(s) |
01/08/2014
|
|---|---|
| Resumo |
We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision.We show that the probability that the expert can persuade the decision maker to take the expert's preferred decision is a hump-shaped function of his costs of sending dishonest messages. |
| Identificador |
http://serval.unil.ch/?id=serval:BIB_921BDAB6B826 isbn:0165-1765 doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.013 |
| Idioma(s) |
en |
| Fonte |
Economics Letters, vol. 124, no. 2, pp. 195-198 |
| Palavras-Chave | #persuasion; costly signaling; expert advice; information distortion |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article article |
