The intuitive basis of implicature: relevance theoretic implicitness versus gricean implying

The notion of implicature was first introduced by Paul Grice (1967, 1989), who defined it essentially as what is communicated less what is said. This definition contributed in part to the proliferation of a large number of different species of implicature by neo-Griceans. Relevance theorists have responded to this by proposing a shift back to the distinction between "explicit" & "implicit" meaning (corresponding to "explicature" & "implicature," respectively). However, they appear to have pared down the concept of implicature too much, ignoring phenomena that may be better treated as implicatures in their overgeneralization of the concept of explicature. These problems have their roots in the fact that explicit & implicit meaning intuitively overlap & thus do not provide a suitable basis for distinguishing implicature from other types of pragmatic phenomena. An alternative conceptualization of implicature based on the concept of "implying" with which Grice originally associated his notion of implicature is thus proposed. From this definition, it emerges that implicature constitutes something else inferred by the addressee that is not literally said by the speaker. Instead, it is meant in addition to what the speaker literally says & is consequently defeasible like all other types of pragmatic phenomena. 1 Figure, 60 References. Adapted from the source document