The coincidences of time travel


Autoria(s): Dowe, Phil
Contribuinte(s)

J. Barrett

Data(s)

01/01/2003

Resumo

In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive way to defend Horwich's argument against the second of Smith's objections, but show that it too fails. I conclude that unless there is something faulty in the conception of explanation implicit in Horwich's argument, time travel presents us with nothing that is inexplicable.

Identificador

http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:39483/HCA10UQ39483.pdf

http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:39483

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

University of Chicago Press

Palavras-Chave #Philosophy
Tipo

Journal Article