Symposium - Organisational transformation in policing: Leadership and change in extreme contexts

<br/>Nearly 4000 people died in Northern Ireland’s long running conflict, 314 of them police officers (Brewer and Magee 1991, Brewer 1996, Hennessey 1999, Guelke and Milton-Edwards 2000). The republican and loyalist ceasefires of 1994 were the first significant signal that NI society was moving beyond the ‘troubles’ and towards a normalised political environment. The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998 cemented that movement (Hennessey 1999). Policing was a key and seemingly unresolvable element of the conflict, seen as unrepresentative and partisan. Its reform or ‘recasting’ in a new dispensation was an integral part of the conflict transformation endeavour(Ellison 2010). As one of the most controversial elements of the conflicted past, it had remained outside the Agreement and was subject to a specific commission of interest (1999), generally known as the Patten Commission. The Commission’s far reaching proposals included a change of name, badge and uniform, the introduction of 50/50 recruitment (50% Roman Catholic and 50% other), a new focus on human rights, a new district command and headquarter structure, a review of ‘Special Branch’ and covert techniques, a concern for ‘policing with the community’ and a significant voluntary severance process to make room for new recruits, unconnected with the past history of the organisation(Murphy 2013). <br/><br/>This paper reflects upon the first data collection phase of a long term processual study of organisational change within the Royal Ulster Constabulary / Police Service of Northern Ireland. This phase (1996-2002) covers early organisational change initiation (including the pre-change period) and implementation including the instigation of symbolic changes (name, badge, and crest) and structural changes (new HQ structure and District Command structure). It utilises internal documentation including messages from the organisations leaders, interviews with forty key informants (identified through a combination of snow-balling from referrals by initial contacts, and key interviews with significant individuals), as well as external documentation and commentary on public perceptions of the change. Using a processual lens (Langley, Smallman et al. 2013) it seeks to understand this initial change phase and its relative success in a highly politicised environment. <br/><br/>By engaging key individuals internally and externally, setting up a dedicated change team, adopting a non normative, non urgent, calming approach to dissent, communicating in orthodox and unorthodox ways with members, acknowledging the huge emotional strain of letting go of the organisation’s name and all it embodied, and re-emphasising the role of officers as ‘police first’, rather than ‘RUC first’, the organisations leadership remained in control of a volatile and unhappy organisational body and succeeded in moving it on through this initial phase, even while much of the political establishment lambasted them externally. Three years into this change process the organisation had a new name, a new crest, new structures, procedures and was deeply engaged in embedding the joint principles of human rights and community policing within its re-woven fabric. While significant problems remained, the new Police Service of Northern Ireland had successfully begun a long journey to full community acceptance in a post conflict context.<br/><br/>This case illustrates the significant challenges of leading change under political pressure, with external oversight and no space for failure(Hannah, Uhl-Bien et al. 2009). It empirically reflects the reality of change implementation as messy, disruptive and unpredictable and highlights the significance of political skill and contextual understanding to success in the early stages(Buchanan and Boddy 1992). The implications of this for change theory and the practice of change implementation are explored (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) and some conclusions drawn about what such an extreme case tells us about change generally and change implementation under pressure.<br/>