A 'Technically Level Playing-Field' Profit Efficiency Analysis of Enforced Competition Between Publicly Funded Institutions


Autoria(s): McKillop, Donal; Glass, J.C.; McCallion, G.; Stringer, K.
Data(s)

01/08/2006

Identificador

http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/a-technically-level-playingfield-profit-efficiency-analysis-of-enforced-competition-between-publicly-funded-institutions(207ed675-890e-4b22-8e30-9b50e09810fc).html

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.011

http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33745471982&partnerID=8YFLogxK

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess

Fonte

McKillop , D , Glass , J C , McCallion , G & Stringer , K 2006 , ' A 'Technically Level Playing-Field' Profit Efficiency Analysis of Enforced Competition Between Publicly Funded Institutions ' European Economic Review , vol 50(6) , no. 6 , pp. 1601-1626 . DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.011

Palavras-Chave #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002 #Economics and Econometrics #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2003 #Finance
Tipo

article