听觉想象的大脑表征

As a species of internal representation, how is mental imagery organized in the brain? There are two issues related to this question: the time course and the nature of mental imagery. On the nature of mental imagery, today's imagery debate is influenced by two opposing theories: (1) Pylyshyn’s propositional theory and (2) Kosslyn’s depictive representation theory. Behavioural studies indicated that imagery encodes properties of the physical world, such as the spacial and size information of the visual world. Neuroimaging and neuropsychological data indicated that sensory cortex; especially the primary sensory cortex, is involved in imagery. In visual modality, neuroimaging data further indicated that during visual imagery, spatial information is mapped in the primary visual, providing strong evidences for depictive theory. In the auditory modality, behavioural studies also indicated that auditory imagery represents loudness and pitch of sound; this kind of neuroimaging evidence, however, is absent. The aim of the present study was to investigate the time course of auditory imagery processing, and to provide the neuroimaging evidence that imaginal auditory representations encode loudness and pitch information, using the ERP method and a cue-imagery (S1)-S2 paradigm. The results revealed that imagery effects started with an enhancement of the P2, probably indexing the top-down allocation of attention to the imagery task; and continued into a more positive-going late positive potentials (LPC), probably reflecting the formation of auditory imagery. The amplitude of this LPC was inversely related to the pitch of the imagined sound, but directly related to the loudness of the imagined sound, which were consistent with auditory perception related N1 component, providing evidences that auditory imagery encodes pitch and loudness information. When the S2 showed difference in pitch of loudness from the previously imagined S1, the behavioral performance were significantly worse and accordingly a conflict related N2 was elicited; and the high conflict elicited greater N2 amplitude than low conflict condition, providing further evidences that imagery is analog of perception and can encode pitch and loudness information. The present study suggests that imagery starts with an mechanism of top-down allocation of attention to the imagery task; and continuing into the step of imagery formation during which the physical features of the imagined stimulus can be encoded, providing supports to Kosslyn’s depictive representation theory.