‘Neptune’ between ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Vulcan’: On descriptive names and non-existence
Data(s) |
24/04/2012
24/04/2012
2005
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Resumo |
[EN]This work will focus on some aspects of descriptive names. The New Theory of Reference, in line with Kripke, takes descriptive names to be proper names. I will argue in this paper that descriptive names and certain theory in reference to them, even when it disagrees with the New Theory of Reference, can shed light on our understanding of (some) non-existence statements. I define the concept of descriptive name for hypothesised object (DNHO). My thesis being that DNHOs are, as I will specify, descriptions: a proposition expressed by the utterance ‘n is F’, where ‘n’ is a DNHO, is not singular at all; it is a descriptive proposition. To sum up, concerning proper names, the truth lies closer to the New Theory of Reference, but descriptivism is not altogether false. As for DNHOs descriptivism is, in some cases, the right fit. |
Identificador |
Acta Analytica 20(3) : 48-58 (2005) 0353-5150 http://hdl.handle.net/10810/7472 10.1007/s12136-005-1029-8 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Springer |
Relação |
http://www.springerlink.com/content/0353-5150/ |
Direitos |
(c)2005 Springer. The final publication is avalaible at www.springerlink.com info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Palavras-Chave | #descriptive names #descriptive name for hypothesised object #empty names #non-existence statements #new theory of reference |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |