Unintended consequences of regulatory reporting requirements for small and medium size construction entities : Australian evidence

The Queensland Building Services Authority (QBSA) regulates the construction industry in Queensland, Australia, with licensing requirements creating differential financial reporting obligations, depending on firm size. Economic theories of regulation and behaviour provide a framework for investigating effects of the financial constraints and financial reporting requirements imposed by QBSA licensing. Data are analysed for all small and medium construction entities operating in Queensland between 2001 and 2006. Findings suggesting that construction licensees are categorizing themselves as smaller to avoid the more onerous and costly financial reporting of higher licensee categories are consistent with US findings from the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) regulation which created incentives for small firms to stay small to avoid the costs of compliance with more onerous financial reporting requirements. Such behaviour can have the undesirable economic consequences of adversely affecting employment, investment, wealth creation and financial stability. Insights and implications from the analysed QBSA processes are important for future policy reform and design, and useful to be considered where similar regulatory approaches are planned.