An approach to access control under uncertainty


Autoria(s): Salim, Farzad; Reid, Jason F.; Dulleck, Uwe; Dawson, Edward
Data(s)

22/08/2011

Resumo

In dynamic and uncertain environments such as healthcare, where the needs of security and information availability are difficult to balance, an access control approach based on a static policy will be suboptimal regardless of how comprehensive it is. The uncertainty stems from the unpredictability of users’ operational needs as well as their private incentives to misuse permissions. In Role Based Access Control (RBAC), a user’s legitimate access request may be denied because its need has not been anticipated by the security administrator. Alternatively, even when the policy is correctly specified an authorised user may accidentally or intentionally misuse the granted permission. This paper introduces a novel approach to access control under uncertainty and presents it in the context of RBAC. By taking insights from the field of economics, in particular the insurance literature, we propose a formal model where the value of resources are explicitly defined and an RBAC policy (entailing those predictable access needs) is only used as a reference point to determine the price each user has to pay for access, as opposed to representing hard and fast rules that are always rigidly applied.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://eprints.qut.edu.au/45673/

Publicador

IEEE

Relação

http://eprints.qut.edu.au/45673/1/paper.pdf

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6045932

DOI:10.1109/ARES.2011.11

Salim, Farzad, Reid, Jason F., Dulleck, Uwe, & Dawson, Edward (2011) An approach to access control under uncertainty. In ARES, IEEE, Vienna University of Technology, Vienna, pp. 1-8.

Direitos

Copyright 2011 IEEE

Fonte

QUT Business School; Computer Science; Faculty of Science and Technology; Information Security Institute; School of Economics & Finance

Palavras-Chave #080303 Computer System Security #Access Control #Authorisation, RBAC #Risk #Insider Problem #Incentives, Budget.
Tipo

Conference Paper