Algebraic Analysis of LEX
| Contribuinte(s) |
Brankovic, Ljiljana Susilo, Willy |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
2009
|
| Resumo |
LEX is a stream cipher that progressed to Phase 3 of the eSTREAM stream cipher project. In this paper, we show that the security of LEX against algebraic attacks relies on a small equation system not being solvable faster than exhaustive search. We use the byte leakage in LEX to construct a system of 21 equa- tions in 17 variables. This is very close to the require- ment for an efficient attack, i.e. a system containing 16 variables. The system requires only 36 bytes of keystream, which is very low. |
| Formato |
application/pdf |
| Identificador | |
| Publicador |
Australian Computer Society, Inc. |
| Relação |
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/27517/1/Zaba-et-al-Algebraic-LEX.pdf Z'aba, Muhammad Reza, Raddum, Havard, Simpson, Leonie, Dawson, Ed, Henricksen, Matt, & Wong, Kenneth (2009) Algebraic Analysis of LEX. In Brankovic, Ljiljana & Susilo, Willy (Eds.) Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC2009), 20-23 January 2009, Wellington, New Zealand. |
| Fonte |
Information Security Institute |
| Palavras-Chave | #080402 Data Encryption #LEX #Advanced Encryption Standard #Stream Cipher |
| Tipo |
Conference Paper |
