Voter behaviour and constitutional change in Australia since 1967

Australian Constitutional referendums have been part of the Australian political system since federation. Up to the year 1999 (the time of the last referendum in Australia), constitutional change in Australia does not have a good history of acceptance. Since 1901, there have been 44 proposed constitutional changes with eight gaining the required acceptance according to section 128 of the Australian Constitution. In the modern era since 1967, there have been 20 proposals over seven referendum votes for a total of four changes. Over this same period, there have been 13 federal general elections which have realised change in government just five times. This research examines the electoral behaviour of Australian voters from 1967 to 1999 for each referendum. Party identification has long been a key indicator in general election voting. This research considers whether the dominant theory of voter behaviour in general elections (the Michigan Model) provides a plausible explanation for voting in Australian referendums. In order to explain electoral behaviour in each referendum, this research has utilised available data from the Australian Electoral Commission, the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data, and the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study. This data has provided the necessary variables required to measure the impact of the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. Measurements have been conducted using bivariate and multivariate analyses. Each referendum provides an overview of the events at the time of the referendum as well as the =yes‘ and =no‘ cases at the time each referendum was initiated. Results from this research provide support for the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in Australian referendum voting. This research concludes that party identification, as a key variable of the Michigan Model, shows that voters continue to take their cues for voting from the political party they identify with in Australian referendums. However, the outcome of Australian referendums clearly shows that partisanship is only one of a number of contributory factors in constitutional referendums.

The multiple hierarchical legislatures in representative democracy

Multiple hierarchical models of representative democracies in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives and state representatives a president, reduces the number of electors a representative is answerable for, and therefore, considering each level separately, these models could come closer to direct democracy. In this paper we show that worst case policy bias increases with the number of hierarchical levels. This also means that the opportunities of a gerrymanderer increase in the number of hierarchical levels.

The Multiple Hierarchical Legislatures in a Representative Democracy: Districting for Policy Implementation

We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases because of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters gives a district maker an advantage, enabling her to implement her favorite policy. We also show that the range of implementable policies increases with the depth of the hierarchical system. Consequently, districting by a candidate in a hierarchical legislative system can be viewed as a type of policy implementation device.

Is Web 2.0 a threat to representative democracy? A deliberation through the Australian carbon tax debate

The influence of social media is intensifying in global societies. As the technologies become cheaper and the acceptance of Web 2.0 becomes widespread, the power of social media on citizens, particularly the integrated influence of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and blogs cannot be underestimated. In this paper, we attempt a deliberation through the lens of carbon tax debate in Australia where the influence of social media has perhaps begun to portend the role of elected representation in this representative democracy.

Invalid ballots and the “crisis of representative democracy”:re-inventing protest at the 2012 Serbian elections

This article examines the ways in which invalidated electoral ballots may be articulated as acts of protest. We argue that some instances of ballot invalidation can be understood as protest and as a reaction to the broader “crises of democracy” which have also spurred on movements such as Occupy. We focus on Serbia’s 2012 elections as a case study, given the high increases in invalid ballots and calls for collective action calling for ballot invalidation. We discuss protest movements which coalesced around this election, calling for electoral ballot invalidation and using social media to frame this activity as protest. Through our case study, we explore the ways in which the ballot can become a tool of contention, and how protest can be expressed through an engagement with extant structures and institutions.

Anti-apathy approaches in representative democracies: e-governance and web 2.0-facilitating citizen involvement?

Apathetic citizens disenchanted with conventional channels of participation in democratic processes are a predicament for mature representative democracies, as it reflects in the depleting voter turnouts in elections and participation in community associations. Recognising the reverberations of this apathy on governance, economies ostensibly search for anti apathy approaches. Recently E-governance using the pervasive power of the internet/Web 2.0, during the election has been instrumental for democratic engagement. We considered Australia and France, applying a historiographical view exploring the pre-election scenarios, attempting to evaluate the use of the Internet/Web 2.0 as valid benchmarking anti-apathy approaches of e-governance, to facilitate citizen participation.

Political participation in Australia : contingency in the behaviour and attitudes of citizens

Putting people in planning: participatory democracy, community building and social inclusion

Like other Western nations, since the nineteenth century Australia has been a representative democracy, in which citizens elect parliamentary representatives to make decisions and develop policies on their behalf (see chapter 5). These representatives are supported in their decision making by an ‘arm’s-length’, ‘techno-bureaucratic administration’, which includes experts such as environmental planners (Fung and Wright 2003, p. 3). However, as the issues for decision-making become increasingly complex, and societies increasingly diverse, the idea of citizen participation in decision-making is ever more accepted. There is now a significant body of political theory arguing for a more participatory model of democracy (participatory democracy), a model that strives to create opportunities for all members of a society to contribute meaningfully to decisions about the matters affecting their lives.

Turnout, Participation and Legitimacy in Post-Devolution Wales

Scully, Roger, Jones, Richard Wyn, and Trystan, Dafydd, 'Turnout, Participation and Legitimacy in Post-Devolution Wales', British Journal of Political Science (2004) 34(3) pp.519-537 RAE2008

On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation

This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this assumption PR is not manipulable by any voter aiming at maximisation of the number of seats in the parliament of her most preferred party. However in this paper we assume that voters are concerned, first and foremost, with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We show that, irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there will always exist circumstances where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that a voter’s attitude toward uncertainty can influence her incentives to make an insincere vote. Finally, we show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party must secure at least a certain percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates new opportunities for strategic voting. We use the model to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general election.