Motivation toward financial incentive goals on construction projects

Construction industry observers tout the use of financial incentives as promoters of motivation and commitment on projects. Yet, little empirical evidence exists concerning their effectiveness. What are the drivers of motivation on construction projects? The reasons that construction project participants are motivated to pursue voluntary incentive goals are examined through four Australian case studies. The results demonstrate the critical role played by project relationships and equitable contract conditions in promoting the effectiveness of financial incentives. In the context of a construction project, this study finds financial incentives to be less important to motivation and performance than relationship enhancement initiatives. This finding is unexpected and has implications for the design of project procurement strategies. These results suggest if project clients ignore the importance of relationship quality between participants, the impact of any financial incentive will be compromised.

Incentive mechanisms in infrastructure projects : A case-based comparison between Australia and the Netherlands

Despite a general belief that incentive mechanisms can improve value for money during procurement and performance during project execution, empirical research on the actual effects is nascent. This research focuses on the design and implementation of incentive mechanisms in four different infrastructure projects: two road reconstructions in the Netherlands and two building constructions in Australia. Based on an analytical framework of key motivation drivers, a cross cases analysis is conducted in view of performance on the contract assumptions, selection phase, execution phase and project contract performance. It was identified that despite significant differences in the project characteristics, results indicate that they experience similar contextual drivers on the incentive effectiveness. High value was placed on risk allocation and relationship building in the selection and construction phase. The differences can be explained from both contextual and project related characteristics. Although there are limitations with this research in drawing generalizations across two sets of case projects, the results provide a strong base to explore the nature of incentive systems across different geographical and contextual boundaries in future research.

Incentive-based interventions for increasing physical activity and fitness

This is the protocol for a review and there is no abstract. The objectives are as follows: The main aim of the review is to determine the effectiveness of using incentive-based approaches (IBAs) (financial and non-financial) to increase physical activity in community-dwelling children and adults. A secondary objective will be to address the use of incentives to improve cardiovascular and metabolic fitness. A final objective will be to explore: - whether there are any adverse effects associated with the use of IBAs for increasing physical activity; - whether there are any differential effects of IBAs within and between study populations by age, gender, education, inequalities and health status; and - whether the use of disincentive/aversive approaches leads to a reduction in sedentary behaviour.

Social and cultural drivers of incentive effectiveness in infrastructure projects

Formal incentives systems aim to encourage improved performance by offering a reward for the achievement of project-specific goals. Despite argued benefits of incentive systems on project delivery outcomes, there remains debate over how incentive systems can be designed to encourage the formation of strong project relationships within a complex social system such as an infrastructure project. This challenge is compounded by the increasing emphasis in construction management research on the important mediating influence of technical and organisational context on project performance. In light of this challenge, the research presented in this paper focuses on the design of incentive systems in four infrastructure projects: two road reconstructions in the Netherlands and two building constructions in Australia. Based on a motivational theory frame, a cross case analysis is conducted to examine differences and similarities across social and cultural drivers impacting on the effectiveness of the incentive systems in light of infrastructure project context. Despite significant differences in case project characteristics, results indicate the projects’ experience similar social drivers impacting on incentive effectiveness. Significant value across the projects was placed on: varied performance goals and multiple opportunities to across the project team to pursue incentive rewards; fair risk allocation across contract parties; value-driven tender selection; improved design-build integration; and promotion of future work opportunities. However, differences across the contexts were identified. Results suggest future work opportunities were a more powerful social driver in upholding reputation and establishing strong project relationships in the Australian context. On the other hand, the relationship initiatives in the Dutch context seemed to be more broadly embraced resulting in a greater willingness to collaboratively manage project risk. Although there are limitations with this research in drawing generalizations across two sets of case projects, the results provide a strong base to explore the social and cultural influences on incentive effectiveness across different geographical and contextual boundaries in future research.

The effect of incentive reforms upon productivity : evidence from the Vietnamese rice industry

In this study we use region-level panel data on rice production in Vietnam to investigate total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the period since reunification in 1975. Two significant reforms were introduced during this period, one in 1981 allowing farmers to keep part of their produce, and another in 1987 providing improved land tenure. We measure TFP growth using two modified forms of the standard Malmquist data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, which we have named the Three-year-window (TYW) and the Full Cumulative (FC) methods. We have developed these methods to deal with degrees of freedom limitations. Our empirical results indicate strong average TFP growth of between 3.3 and 3.5 per cent per annum, with the fastest growth observed in the period following the first reform. Our results support the assertion that incentive related issues have played a large role in the decline and subsequent resurgence of Vietnamese agriculture.

A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for decentralized supply chain formation

In this paper we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (Supply Chain Formation with Bayesian Incentive Compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.

Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach

We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoe wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to he bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.

Reforming technology company incentive programs for achieving knowledge-based economic development:a Brazil-Australia comparative study

This doctoral thesis aims to demonstrate the importance of incentives to technology-based firms as a strategy to promote knowledge-based economic development (KBED). To remain competitive, technology-based firms must innovate and seek new markets; therefore, this study aims to propose an incentive model to technology-based firms as a strategy to promote knowledge-based urban development, according to framework described by Yigitcanlar (2011). This is an exploratory and descriptive research with a qualitative approach. Surveys were carried out with national trade associations that represented technology-based firms both in Brazil and Australia. After analysing the surveys, structured interviews were conducted with government representatives, trade associations and businessmen who had used financial support by the federal government. When comparing both countries, the study found the importance of direct incentives through tax incentives, for it is a less bureaucratic, quicker and more direct process for firms. We suggest to include the terms incentives in the framework of knowledge-based urban development, as one of the pillars that contribute to knowledge-based economic development.

Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks

Query incentive networks capture the role of incentives in extracting information from decentralized information networks such as a social network. Several game theoretic tilt:Kids of query incentive networks have been proposed in the literature to study and characterize the dependence, of the monetary reward required to extract the answer for a query, on various factors such as the structure of the network, the level of difficulty of the query, and the required success probability.None of the existing models, however, captures the practical andimportant factor of quality of answers. In this paper, we develop a complete mechanism design based framework to incorporate the quality of answers, in the monetization of query incentive networks. First, we extend the model of Kleinberg and Raghavan [2] to allow the nodes to modulate the incentive on the basis of the quality of the answer they receive. For this qualify conscious model. we show are existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and study the impact of quality of answers on the growth rate of the initial reward, with respect to the branching factor of the network. Next, we present two mechanisms; the direct comparison mechanism and the peer prediction mechanism, for truthful elicitation of quality from the agents. These mechanisms are based on scoring rules and cover different; scenarios which may arise in query incentive networks. We show that the proposed quality elicitation mechanisms are incentive compatible and ex-ante budget balanced. We also derive conditions under which ex-post budget balance can beachieved by these mechanisms.

Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless networks: A game theoretic approach

In this thesis work, we design rigorous and efficient protocols/mechanisms for different types of wireless networks using a mechanism design [1] and game theoretic approach [2]. Our work can broadly be viewed in two parts. In the first part, we concentrate on ad hoc wireless networks [3] and [4]. In particular, we consider broadcast in these networks where each node is owned by independent and selfish users. Being selfish, these nodes do not forward the broadcast packets. All existing protocols for broadcast assume that nodes forward the transit packets. So, there is need for developing new broadcast protocols to overcome node selfishness. In our paper [5], we develop a strategy proof pricing mechanism which we call immediate predecessor node pricing mechanism (IPNPM) and an efficient new broadcast protocol based on IPNPM. We show the efficacy of our proposed broadcast protocol using simulation results.

The EC context for private forestry incentive evaluation.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Incentive mechanism to control customer buy-down behaviour

Airlines have successfully practiced revenue management over the past four decades and enhanced their revenue. Most of the traditional models that are applied assume that customers buying a high-fare class ticket will not purchase a low-fare class ticket even if it is available. This is not a very realistic assumption and has led to revenue leakage due to customers exhibiting buy-down behaviour. This paper aims at devising a suitable incentive mechanism that would incite the customer to reveal his nature. This helps in reducing revenue leakage. We show that the proposed incentive mechanism is profitable to both the buyer and seller and hence ensures the buyers participation in the mechanism. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1566-1573. doi:10.1057/jors.2010.57 Published online 11 August 2010

Broadcast in Adhoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach

We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoc wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to be bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.

Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Resource Procurement in Computational Grids with Rational resource Providers

In a computational grid, the presence of grid resource providers who are rational and intelligent could lead to an overall degradation in the efficiency of the grid. In this paper, we design incentive compatible grid resource procurement mechanisms which ensure that the efficiency of the grid is not affected by the rational behavior of resource providers.In particular, we offer three elegant incentive compatible mechanisms for this purpose: (1) G-DSIC (Grid-Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible) mechanism (2) G-BIC (Grid-Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatible) mechanism (3) G-OPT(Grid-Optimal) mechanism which minimizes the cost to the grid user, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian incentive compatibility and (b) individual rationality. We evaluate the relative merits and demerits of the above three mechanisms using game theoretical analysis and numerical experiments.