Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.

Bayesian estimation of the spatial Durbin error model with an application to voter turnout in the 2004 presidential election

The potential for spatial dependence in models of voter turnout, although plausible from a theoretical perspective, has not been adequately addressed in the literature. Using recent advances in Bayesian computation, we formulate and estimate the previously unutilized spatial Durbin error model and apply this model to the question of whether spillovers and unobserved spatial dependence in voter turnout matters from an empirical perspective. Formal Bayesian model comparison techniques are employed to compare the normal linear model, the spatially lagged X model (SLX), the spatial Durbin model, and the spatial Durbin error model. The results overwhelmingly support the spatial Durbin error model as the appropriate empirical model.

Voter turnout, inflation, and the politics of macroeconomic policy: an empirical essay

This thesis tests some hypotheses regarding the impact of voter turnout on inflation on the assumption that macroeconomic policies depend on voters’ and politicians’ preferences. The work’s empirical basis includes data from 111 nations from the developing world, covering the period from 1978 to 2000. Its main finding indicates that increases in voter turnout co-vary with higher inflation rates, all else held constant.

A Validation Study on Voter Turnout Bias in Switzerland

Surveys on voting behavior typically overestimate turnout rates substantially. To disentangle different sources of bias - coverage error, nonresponse bias, and overreporting - we conducted a validation study in which respondents' self-reported voting behavior was compared to administrative voting records (N = 2000). Our results show that all three sources of error inflate the survey estimate of the turnout rate and also bias estimates from political participation models, although coverage error is only moderate compared to the more pronounced biases due to nonresponse and overreporting. Furthermore, results from a wording experiment do not provide evidence that revised wording reduces measurement bias.

Illinois off-year primary election voter turnout /

Title page preceded by Understanding Illinois off-year primary elections, (4 p.), a non-technical summary of the research.

The Decline in American voter turnout.

Mode of access: Internet.

The effect of economic inequality on voter turnout in Canadian federal elections, 1979-2011

Since the 1990s, voter turnout in Canadian federal elections has decreased considerably. During the same period, economic inequality significantly increased. Although there is much theoretical work, there have been few empirical studies examining the effect of economic inequality on voter turnout. Using data collected from both national and international sources, I conducted an aggregate level, time series analysis of national turnout and economic inequality for Canadian federal elections between 1979 and 2011. Moreover, this thesis tests Schattschneider's (1960) hypothesis, which argues that increasing rates of voter abstention are a result of economic inequality magnifying differences in relative power between affluent and non-affluent citizens. The findings indicate that economic inequality has a strong negative effect on voter turnout.

Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting : evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 12 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.

Bounded rationality and voting decisions over 160 years : voter behavior and increasing complexity in decision-making

Using a quasi-natural voting experiment encompassing a 160-year period (1848–2009) in Switzerland, we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on trusted parliamentary representatives. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations when making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum is held. We also demonstrate that when constituents face a higher level of complexity, they follow the parliamentary recommendations rather than those of interest groups. "Viewed as a geometric figure, the ant’s path is irregular, complex, hard to describe. But its complexity is really a complexity in the surface of the beach, not a complexity in the ant." ([1] p. 51)

Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 11 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.

Turnout, Participation and Legitimacy in Post-Devolution Wales

Scully, Roger, Jones, Richard Wyn, and Trystan, Dafydd, 'Turnout, Participation and Legitimacy in Post-Devolution Wales', British Journal of Political Science (2004) 34(3) pp.519-537 RAE2008

Making Young Voters: The Impact of Preregistration on Youth Turnout

© 2016 by the Midwest Political Science Association.Recent research has cast doubt on the potential for various electoral reforms to increase voter turnout. In this article, we examine the effectiveness of preregistration laws, which allow young citizens to register before being eligible to vote. We use two empirical approaches to evaluate the impact of preregistration on youth turnout. First, we implement difference-in-difference and lag models to bracket the causal effect of preregistration implementation using the 2000-2012 Current Population Survey. Second, focusing on the state of Florida, we leverage a discontinuity based on date of birth to estimate the effect of increased preregistration exposure on the turnout of young registrants. In both approaches, we find preregistration increases voter turnout, with equal effectiveness for various subgroups in the electorate. More broadly, observed patterns suggest that campaign context and supporting institutions may help to determine when and if electoral reforms are effective.

Neighborhood information exchange and voter participation : an experimental study

We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters’ decisions. We do so in a participation game, where some voters (‘receivers’) are told about some other voters’ (‘senders’) turnout decision at a first stage of the game. Cases are distinguished where the voters support the same or different candidates or where they are uncertain about each other’s preferences. Our experimental results show that such information matters. Participation is much higher when information is exchanged than when it is not. Senders strategically try to use their first mover position and some receivers respond to this.