Examining accountability dimensions in state-owned enterprises

This paper examines accountability in the context of New Zealand's state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and considers an accountability framework which extends beyond traditional (upward and outward) dimensions. While traditional accountability dimensions are clearly detailed in the legislation, less clear are the dilemmas and contradictions faced by SOEs, balancing multiple interests, and at times, conflicting objectives. These issues are explored through interviews conducted in two phases over a two year period with senior executives from 12 of the then 17 SOEs operating in New Zealand. Findings reveal a number of dimensions of accountability that extend beyond current conceptualisations of accountability in the public sector, often including multiple directions of accountability. Implications suggest the need for a more explicit framework of accountability relevant to the SOE context, which may serve useful in identifying potential pathways to conflict mitigation.

Strategic entrepreneurship in New Zealand's state-owned enterprises : underlying elements and financial implications

The concept of strategic entrepreneurship has received increased attention over the past ten yeras. Viewed as the intersection of entrepreneurship and strategy this field of research is populated by conceptual studies which focus mainly on the nature and perceived benefits of strategic entrepreneurship. Similarly the study of entrepreneurship in a public sector context has gained increasing support in recent years but also remains underexplored. To address these gaps this thesis considers : what are the underlying elements and financial implications of strategic entrepreneurship in New Zealand's state-owned enterprises, New Zealand's SOE sector comprising 17 government-owned,commercially focused organisations, is considered to be a prime subject for this research. Well known for their implementation of new public management, many New Zealand SOEs have also been publicly recognised as both innovative and entrepreneurial. The research question is addressed by first developing a preliminary framework of strategic entrepreneurship from literature on entrepreneurhsip and strategy. The framework is then examined in the context of case studies on activity.

Managing state-owned enterprises in an age of crisis:An analysis of irish experience

As with all aspects of public management, the control, financing, and regulation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are matters subject to changing international trends and domestic political imperatives. The effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the ownership, financing, and role of SOEs are still unfolding, but undoubtedly will be heavily influenced by a new era of public sector reforms principally designed to reassert central political controls, as well as by fiscal pressures to balance state budgets. In this regard, the Irish experience is instructive, with the findings from two datasets being used here to examine various modes of state enterprise control and their corresponding autonomy. Significantly, there has been considerable variety within and across the SOE sector, demonstrating the need for more detailed understanding of how SOEs are managed. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.

The effectiveness of non-executive directors in Chinese state-owned enterprises

Purpose – The primary aim of this paper is to examine whether boards of directors with independent members function as effective corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs), by analysing four characteristics of non-executive directors (NEDs) that impact on their effectiveness, namely their degree of independence, information, incentive, and competence. Design/methodology/approach – Being exploratory in nature, the research uses qualitative methods for data collection. It is based on an interpretivist perspective of social sciences, analysing and explaining the factors that influence the effectiveness of NEDs. Findings – The findings indicate that the NED system is weak in China as a result of the concentrated ownership structure, unique business culture, intervention of controlling shareholders and the lack of understanding of the benefits brought by NEDs. Research limitations/implications – The paper examines the salient features of and challenges to the system of NEDs of SOEs in present-day China. It provides an understanding of how the various perceptions of the board, gathered from in-depth interviews of corporate directors, leads to new interpretations of board effectiveness. The research, however, is limited owing to a relatively small sample size and the sensitive nature of the information collected. Originality/value – The study aims to fill gaps in the literature and contribute to it by assessing the “real” views and perceptions of NEDs in China in an institutional environment significantly different from that of the USA, the UK and other western economies.

State-Owned Enterprises, Inequality, and Political Ideology

State-owned enterprises continue to play a considerable role in many economies. In this study we empirically investigate the connections between these enterprises and inequality as mediated through political ideology. Using cross-country data on the relative size of the state-owned enterprise sector, we find strong empirical support for an inverted U-shaped relationship between its size and income inequality. We also find strong evidence that left-wing (vis-a-vis right-wing) governments are associated with a larger state-owned enterprise sector in countries with higher inequality. This result is robust to using cross-sectional vs. panel data, different identification strategies, and various controls.

On the efficiency of private and state-owned enterprises in mixed markets

We examine oligopoly models of vertical product differentiation in which producing firms face variable costs of quality development. We show that comparing to private oligopoly, mixed oligopoly – whereby state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms coexist – enhances social welfare but reduces firms' profitability. We also demonstrate that Bertrand competition makes firms better off under mixed oligopoly but it makes firms worse off under private oligopoly compared with Cournot competition. These findings help to justify both the existence of SOEs and the efficiency of SOEs and private firms in mixed markets in transitional economies.

State-owned enterprises, competition and product quality

We consider a general oligopoly model with consumer surplus moderated quantity competition among state-owned enterprises (SOEs), where the SOEs employ workers who are members of the state-owned worker union and produce differentiated products. We show that increasing the number of SOEs would lead to an outcome in which these enterprises choose a lower level of product quality and this, in turn, results in welfare losses for the society, depending on the degree of substitutability. Our findings are consistent with the evidence from China and uncovers important linkages that exist between worker union, product quality and competition, and that have mostly been ignored in the industrial organisation, trade and development literature.

The Effects of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in Poland and East Germany

The main goal of this project was to propose appropriate methods of analysing the effects of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, methods which were then tested on a limited sample of 16 Polish and 8 German enterprises privatised in 1992. A considerable amount of information was collected relating to the six-year period 1989-1994 relating to most aspects of the companies' activities. The effects of privatisation were taken to be those changes within the enterprises which were the result of privatisation, in such areas as production, the productivity of labour and fixed assets, investments and innovations, employment and wages, economic incentives (especially for top managers), financing (internal and external sources), bad debts and economic effects (financial analysis). A second important goal was to identify the main factors which represent methodological obstacles in surveys of the effects of privatisation during a period of fundamental transformation of the entire economic system. The list of enterprises for the research was compiled in such a way as to allow for the differentiation of ownership structures of privatised firms and to permit (at least to a certain extent) the empirical verification of some hypotheses regarding the privatisation process. The enterprises selected were divided into the following three groups representing (as far as possible) various types of ownership structures or types of control: (1) enterprises control by strategic investors (domestic or foreign), (2) enterprises controlled by employees (employee-owned companies), (3) enterprises controlled by managers. Formal methods such as econometric models with varying parameters were used to separate pure privatisation effects from other factors which influence various aspects of an enterprise's working, including policies on the productivity of labour and capital, average wages, the remuneration of top managers, etc. While the group admits that their findings and conclusions cannot be treated as representative of all privatised enterprises in Poland and Germany, they found considerable convergence with their findings and those of other surveys conducted on a wider scale. The main hypotheses that were confirmed included that privatisation (especially in companies controlled by large investors and managers) leads to a significant increase in the effectiveness of these production process, growing pay differentials between different employee groups (e.g. between executives and rank-and-file employees) and between different jobs and positions within particular professional groups. They also confirmed the growing importance in incentives to top executives of incentives linked with the company's economic effects (particularly profit-related incentives), long-term incentives and the capital market.