Predicting performance on fluid intelligence from speed of processing, working memory, and controlled attention

Fluid inteliigence has been defined as an innate ability to reason which is measured commonly by the Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM). Individual differences in fluid intelligence are currently explained by the Cascade model (Fry & Hale, 1996) and the Controlled Attention hypothesis (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Kane & Engle, 2002). The first theory is based on a complex relation among age, speed, and working memory which is described as a Cascade. The alternative to this theory, the Controlled Attention hypothesis, is based on the proposition that it is the executive attention component of working memory that explains performance on fluid intelligence tests. The first goal of this study was to examine whether the Cascade model is consistent within the visuo-spatial and verbal-numerical modalities. The second goal was to examine whether the executive attention component ofworking memory accounts for the relation between working memory and fluid intelligence. Two hundred and six undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and 28 completed a battery of cognitive tests selected to measure processing speed, working memory, and controlled attention which were selected from two cognitive modalities, verbalnumerical and visuo-spatial. These were used to predict performance on two standard measures of fluid intelligence: the Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM) and the Shipley Institute of Living Scales (SILS) subtests. Multiple regression and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) were used to test the Cascade model and to determine the independent and joint effects of controlled attention and working memory on general fluid intelligence. Among the processing speed measures only spatial scan was related to the RPM. No other significant relations were observed between processing speed and fluid intelligence. As 1 a construct, working memory was related to the fluid intelligence tests. Consistent with the predictions for the RPM there was support for the Cascade model within the visuo-spatial modality but not within the verbal-numerical modality. There was no support for the Cascade model with respect to the SILS tests. SEM revealed that there was a direct path between controlled attention and RPM and between working memory and RPM. However, a significant path between set switching and RPM explained the relation between controlled attention and RPM. The prediction that controlled attention mediated the relation between working memory and RPM was therefore not supported. The findings support the view that the Cascade model may not adequately explain individual differences in fluid intelligence and this may be due to the differential relations observed between working memory and fluid intelligence across different modalities. The findings also show that working memory is not a domain-general construct and as a result its relation with fluid intelligence may be dependent on the nature of the working memory modality.

Mathematical prerequisites for learning statistics in Psychology: Assessing core skills of numeracy and mathematical reasoning among undergraduates.

This study sought to extend earlier work by Mulhern and Wylie (2004) to investigate a UK-wide sample of psychology undergraduates. A total of 890 participants from eight universities across the UK were tested on six broadly defined components of mathematical thinking relevant to the teaching of statistics in psychology - calculation, algebraic reasoning, graphical interpretation, proportionality and ratio, probability and sampling, and estimation. Results were consistent with Mulhern and Wylie's (2004) previously reported findings. Overall, participants across institutions exhibited marked deficiencies in many aspects of mathematical thinking. Results also revealed significant gender differences on calculation, proportionality and ratio, and estimation. Level of qualification in mathematics was found to predict overall performance. Analysis of the nature and content of errors revealed consistent patterns of misconceptions in core mathematical knowledge , likely to hamper the learning of statistics.

The psychology of reasoning, based on experimental researches in hypnotism;

Tr. of: La psychologie du raisonnement

Perception of affordances in multi-scale dynamics as an alternative explanation for equivalence of analogical and inferential reasoning in animals and humans

Recent claims of equivalence of animal and human reasoning are evaluated and a study of avian cognition serves as an exemplar of weaknesses in these arguments. It is argued that current research into neurobiological cognition lacks theoretical breadth to substantiate comparative analyses of cognitive function. Evaluation of a greater range of theoretical explanations is needed to verify claims of equivalence in animal and human cognition. We conclude by exemplifying how the notion of affordances in multi-scale dynamics can capture behavior attributed to processes of analogical and inferential reasoning in animals and humans.

Towards a model for student selection in clinical psychology

Background Selection of candidates for clinical psychology programmes is arguably the most important decision made in determining the clinical psychology workforce. However, there are few models to inform the development of selection tools to support selection procedures. The study, using a factor analytic structure, has operationalised the model predicting applicants' capabilities. Method Eighty-eight clinical applicants for entry into a postgraduate clinical psychology programme were assessed on a series of tasks measuring eight capabilities: guided reflection, communication skills, ethical decision making, writing, conceptual reasoning, empathy, and awareness of mind and self-observation. Results Factor analysis revealed three capabilities: labelled “awareness” accounting for 35.71% of variance; “reflection” accounting for 20.56%; and “reasoning” accounting for 18.24% of variance. Fourth year grade point average (GPA) did not correlate with performance on any of the selection capabilities other than a weak correlation with performance on the ethics capability. Conclusions Eight selection capabilities are identified for the selection of candidates independent of GPA. While the model is tentative, it is hoped that the findings will stimulate the development and validation of assessment procedures with good predictive validity which will benefit the training of clinical psychologists and, ultimately, effective service delivery.

Qualitative spatial reasoning about directions in a corridor containing a single turn

An experiment was conducted to investigate the process of reasoning about directions in an egocentric space. Each participant walked through a corridor containing an angular turn ranging in size from 0° to 90°, in 15° increments. A direction was given to participants at the entrance of the corridor and they were asked to answer this direction at the end of this corridor. Considering the fact that participants had to reason the direction in the featureless corridor, two hypotheses were proposed: (i) reasoning about directions falls into qualitative reasoning by using a small number of coarse angular categories (four 90° categories or eight 45° categories: 90° categories consist of front, back, left, right; 45° categories consist of 90° categories and the four intermediates) that reference axes generate; (ii) reasoning about directions would be done by recalling the rotation angle from the traveling direction to the direction that participants tried to answer. In addition, the configuration of reference axes that participants employed was examined. Both hypotheses were supported, and the data designated that reference axes consisted of eight directions: a pair of orthogonal axes and diagonals.

Using the TARL Model in Psychology: Supporting First and Final Year Students to Compose Reflections

Reflective thinking is an important skill in psychology, both as a tool in the therapeutic process and in professional development. The adapted 4Rs Model provides reflective writing structure and highlights the importance of Reporting & Responding, Relating, Reasoning and Reconstructing to students who are new to writing reflections. This chapter presents a case in which the 4Rs model (modified from the 5Rs model in Chap. 2 of this edition) was adopted to support reflective writing skills of undergraduate psychology students in a first year unit and in a final year unit. Although all students reflected on their learning within the units, the support activities leading up to the reflective tasks were adjusted to account for differences in the abilities of the cohorts and the focus of the units. In an evaluation survey, both groups of students endorsed statements about the importance of reflections and the utility of using the model. First year students also reported some difficulties understanding the 4Rs. This chapter will explore how first and final year students can be supported to develop reflection skills through scaffolding and modification of the same approaches and model.

Quantum cognition: A new theoretical approach to psychology

What type of probability theory best describes the way humans make judgments under uncertainty and decisions under conflict? Although rational models of cognition have become prominent and have achieved much success, they adhere to the laws of classical probability theory despite the fact that human reasoning does not always conform to these laws. For this reason we have seen the recent emergence of models based on an alternative probabilistic framework drawn from quantum theory. These quantum models show promise in addressing cognitive phenomena that have proven recalcitrant to modeling by means of classical probability theory. This review compares and contrasts probabilistic models based on Bayesian or classical versus quantum principles, and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Judgmental-analytical procedures for adapting tests: Adaptation to Spanish of the Reasoning Tests Battery

Adapting a test between cultures or languages requires taking into account legal, linguistic, metric, and use-related considerations. Significantly more attention has been paid to the methodological aspects involved in the study of metric equivalence than to judgmental-analytical procedures prior to the empirical confirmation stage. However, considering the latter is crucial in the adaptation process. Along these lines, this paper seeks to describe and focus on the relevance of the previous stages, thereby offering a systematization process that comprises ten sections. This approach contributes to ensuring the construction of a test adapted and equivalent in as much as possible to the original. This process is exemplified by means of a Spanish language adaptation of a cognitive test originally designed in Portuguese for the Portuguese population, the Reasoning Test Battery. Copyright (C) 2013, Konrad Lorenz University Foundation. Published by Elsevier Espana, S.L.U.

Inductive reasoning and semantic cognition: More than just different names for the same thing?

We describe evidence that certain inductive phenomena are associated with IQ, that different inductive phenomena emerge at different ages, and that the effects of causal knowledge on induction are decreased under conditions of memory load. On the basis of this evidence we argue that there is more to inductive reasoning than semantic cognition.