The application of the statutory derivative action in Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5 : Well oiled machine or is Pt 2F.1A in need of a tune up?

The statutory derivative action was introduced in Australia in 2000. This right of action has been debated in the literature and introduced in a number of other jurisdictions as well. However, it is by no means clear that all issues have been resolved despite its operation in Australia for over 10 years. This article considers the application of Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5. It demonstrates that the application involves consideration of not only proper statutory interpretation but also policy matters around the role and the supervision by the court of a liquidator once a company has entered liquidation.

Setting aside default judgment - whether judgment regularly or irregularly entered - service under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s109X(1) - requirements for affadavit of service

In Hill v Robertson Suspension Systems Pty Ltd [2009] QDC 165 McGill DCJ considered the procedural requirements for the service of originating process on a company, and for proving that service for the purpose of obtaining default judgment.The judge’s views adopt a strict and technical construction of the requirements for an affidavit of service under r 120(1)(b). Though clearly obiter, they may well affect the approach taken on applications to enter or set aside default judgments in the lower courts. Pending further judicial consideration of the issue, it is suggested the prudent course is to ensure that the deponent of an affidavit for service effected under s 109X(1)(a) of the Act deposes not only to the location of the registered office of the company but also, at a minimum, provides the source of that information.

Corporations Act 2001 s 459G : application to set aside statutory demand

The application before the court in Millerview Constructions Pty Ltd v Palmer Plumbing Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 005 raised a significant question regarding the appropriate construction of s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act). The decision emphasises the importance of ensuring that any application to set aside a statutory demand must be served in a timely way on the creditor at the creditor’s address for service as stated in the statutory demand, or in strict compliance with another manner authorised by the Act.

A sample review of Deeds of Company Arrangement under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act

An empirical review of the operation of Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) is timely given that Australia’s corporate rescue regime marked its 20 year anniversary in 2013. The research project culminating in this report was funded by the 2013 ARITA Terry Taylor Scholarship and entailed a review of a random sample of 72 executed DOCAs (and associated reports and returns) which were effectuated between 1 August 2012 and 31 July 2013. This sample review of DOCAs was undertaken with the intention of producing a ‘snapshot’ of current practices and trends pertaining to DOCAs – ie, average (or typical) rate of dividends paid, the outcomes or goals which DOCAs customarily achieve (eg, genuine company rescues, workouts, enhanced asset realisations or ‘quasi-liquidations’), the profile of the companies executing DOCAs and the average term/duration of DOCAs. The purpose and value of this sample review was to empirically assess the use and effectiveness of one important aspect of Part 5.3A and to further inform consideration and debate as to whether changes are warranted to Australia’s voluntary administration regime.

Statutory injunction - call for amendment to s 1324 of the Corporations Act

It is well documented that s 1324 is a useful tool for restraining a person from engaging in conduct that contravenes the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Without examining the provision, one tends to agree with that statement. In practice, however, the provision does not often provide the outcome that is expected. The author argues that the lack of use of s 1324 is due to the uncertainty and ambiguity in the application of the provision. Unlike with ASIC, the test that a person must satisfy when applying for an injunction is not clear cut. Whether damages could be claimed under s 1324 in place of an injunction is also unclear. The article sets out to argue that some integration with the equitable principles is vital for the survival of s 1324, as injunctions are traditionally a remedy conferred in equity and the Parliament has adopted the concept.

The regulation of insurance intermediaries in the Australian financial services market

The insurance industry discharges a critical role in the Australian economy and is a significant part of the Australian financial services market. The industry relies upon intermediaries, the principal types being brokers and agents, to promote, arrange and distribute their products and services in the market. The pivotal role that they play in this context and sensitivities associated with the consumer oriented products, such as house and contents insurance, has ensured close regulatory attention. Of particular importance was the passage of the Insurance (Agents and Brokers) Act 1984 (Cth), a comprehensive attempt to address the responsibilities of intermediaries as well as particular problem areas associated with the handling of money. However, with the introduction of financial services and market reform early in the new millennium this insurance intermediary specific regulatory approach was abandoned in favour of a market-wide strategy; that is, market reform was based upon across-the-board licensing, disclosure, conduct and fairness standards, and all financial products and services are now regulated at a generic level under Ch 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This article briefly explores the categories of insurance intermediaries and the relevant distinctions between them but focuses mainly upon the regulatory context in which they operate. This context transcends a strictly legal framework as the regulatory body, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), has sought to inform and guide the market through Policy Statements and Regulatory Guides. The usefulness of these guides as an adjunct to the legislation in explaining the scope and operation of regulatory framework is examined. In addition, the article looks at the self-regulatory and dispute resolution practices in this area and their impact. In conclusion an assessment of this across-the-board regulatory regime is advanced.

The Australian corporate rescue provisions : how do they compare?

A notable feature of corporate legislative development in western countries for the past 30 years is the various mechanisms introduced to facilitate the survival of company structures facing insolvency. Australia’s corporate rescue version, called a “voluntary administration”, is now contained in Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), although first introduced in 1993. The Australian provisions apply to all corporate entities and commence with a short moratorium followed by a meeting of creditors. At the creditors’ meeting a “rescue” plan called a deed of company arrangement may be entered into, or, alternatively the company may be liquidated. The voluntary administration provisions have become a significant part of Australia’s corporate insolvency landscape and are critical to the operation of corporate law outside of insolvency. Australia does not have a specialist bankruptcy court, rather it utilises the English approach where insolvency practitioners are accountants and appointed to the insolvent company as administrators. In Australia, insolvency practitioners must be registered with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”), the corporate and securities regulator. A voluntary administration is usually commenced by the board of directors appointing an insolvency practitioner to the company. There exists no opportunity for a voluntary administration to commence at the creditors’ or court’s behest. This chapter seeks to address the comparative necessity of Australia’s corporate regime.

Australian DOCAs versus UK pre-packs and CVAs : sifting through the ashes of comparative dividend returns

This article is something of a brief extension of recent research into deeds of company arrangement (DOCAs) under Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), conducted with the support of the Australian Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association’s (ARITA’s) Terry Taylor Scholarship (TTS). This article presents some of the findings of that research (namely, the dividend outcomes delivered by sampled Australian DOCAs) in a manner consistent with reports which have recently emerged from similar research conducted in the UK. In so doing, a basic comparison can be made of the performance of Australian DOCAs against analogous UK procedures.

Related party transactions under Pt 2E of the corporations act: time for reconsideration

The related party provisions under Pt 2E of the Corporations Act 2001 were introduced in 1992 to protect the resources of companies and shareholder interests by requiring that directors disclose financial benefits given to 'related parties' -- those capable of exercising significant influence over the giving of such benefits. The contention of the authors in this article is that Pt 2E has been unsuccessful in achieving its intended purpose, and should be repealed in its entirety. The authors argue that the various provisions of Pt 2E are so confusing and convoluted that they potentially violate the rule of law virtue that laws must be promulgated in a manner that is clear, so that it is apparent from reading the laws what one must do. Further, [*2] the manner in which Pt 2E is presently drafted, especially the definition of related party, fails to reflect the purpose behind the provisions, making the overall operation of Pt 2E ineffective. It is also argued that Pt 2E is superfluous since the fiduciary duty of directors to disclose a conflict of interest, and to a lesser extent the requirement for disclosure of material personal interests under s 191 of the Corporations Act, adequately deal with the transactions presently attracting the attention of Pt 2E. In light of all this, it is contended that the law would be demonstrably improved by repealing Pt 2E.

Has the Financial Services Reform Act fixed the problems with the regulation of securities and derivatives?

The Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth) introduced new definitions of“derivative” and “financial product” into the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), andreplaced the separate regulatory regimes governing futures contracts andsecurities with a single financial markets authorisation regime and a singleintermediary licensing regime. This article examines the reforms to evaluatewhether they have been successful. It is argued that there are definiteimprovements resulting from the reforms, and the scope for regulatoryarbitrage has been greatly reduced. However, numerous problems remain.There are significant differences in the regulation of securities and deriva-tives. The distinction between securities and derivatives is still based on legalcharacteristics, not economic function. There is uncertainty as to the exactscope and interaction of the definitions, particularly with respect to equityderivatives, warrants and options. The current law has thus not fullyaddressed many of the problems that existed prior to the reforms.

Preliminary review of over-regulation in Australian financial services

This article examines a preliminary review and the limited evidence of over-regulation in Australian financial services. The 1997 Wallis Report and the CLERP 6 paper resulted in the amendments to Ch 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) by the Financial Services Reform Act. Nearly a decade later the system based upon 'one-size fits all' dual track regime and a consistent licensing regime has greatly increased the costs of compliance. In the area of enforcement there has not been a dramatic change to the effective techniques applied by ASIC over other agencies such as APRA. In particular there are clear economic arguments, as well as international experiences which state that a single financial services regulator is more effective than the multi-layered approach adopted in Australia. Finally, in the superannuation area of financial services, which is worth A$800 billion there is unnecessary dual licensing and duplicated regulation with little evidence of any consumer-member benefit but at a much greater cost

The inherent equitable jurisdiction and the plenary power of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to order the winding up of companies

Not all companies in Australia are amenable to a winding up order pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court of New South Wales has previously dealt with such winding up applications by apparently focusing on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to firstly consider the winding up application. This article proposes an original alternative paradigm: the plenary power provided to the court by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) can be utilised to initially attract the jurisdiction of the court and subsequently the inherent jurisdiction specifically utilising the equitable “just and equitable” ground is available to the court to consider and make such a winding up order if appropriate. Variation of such a paradigm may also be available to the court when considering the inherent jurisdiction in relation to corporation matters more generally.

Notification of data breaches under the continuous disclosure regime

Consumer personal information is now a valuable commodity for most corporations. Concomitant with increased value is the expansion of new legal obligations to protect personal information. Mandatory data breach notification laws are an important new development in this regard. Such laws require a corporation that has suffered a data breach, which involves personal information, such as a computer hacking incident, to notify those persons who may have been affected by the breach. Regulators may also need to be notified. Australia currently does not have a mandatory data breach notification law but this may be about to change. The Australian Law Reform Commission has suggested that a data breach notification scheme be implemented through the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). However, the notification of data breaches may already be required under the continuous disclosure regime stipulated by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules. Accordingly, this article examines whether the notification of data breaches is a statutory requirement of the existing continuous disclosure regime and whether the ASX should therefore be notified of such incidents.

Franchisor failure : an assessment of the adequacy of regulatory response

Franchisor failure is one of the most problematic areas of the franchise relationship. It impacts negatively on landlords and other suppliers, but the contracting parties that are currently without legal rights to respond when a franchisor fails, and thus without consumer protection, are its franchisees. In this thesis I explore the current contractual, regulatory and commercial environment that franchisees inhabit, within the context of franchisor failure. I conclude that ex ante there are opportunities to level the playing field through consumer protection legislation. I also conclude that the task is not one solely for the consumer protection legislation; the problem should also be addressed ex post through the Corporations Act.

Does section 420A impose ‘strict liability’ upon controllers for acts or omissions of agents and experts?

This article addresses in depth the question of whether section 420A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) imposes ‘strict liability’ upon a controller for the failure of an agent or expert to take reasonable care. The weight of existing authority appears to suggest that controllers are liable under s 420A for the carelessness of their agents or expert advisers. However, a closer analysis of the text of the provision and relevant Australian and UK case law demonstrates that this aspect of the statutory construction of s 420A remains very much an open question. This article ultimately contends for a construction of s 420A which requires a controller to adequately supervise and scrutinise, but which does not render a blameless controller strictly liable for all careless acts and omissions of agents and expert advisers.